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Now, say, would it be worth for man on earth, if he were not a citizen?
Dante, The Divine Comedy
I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of citizenship has come to represent the full cluster of
civil rights held by individuals as members of modern states. Therefore,
of all the "reforms" undertaken by South Africa in response to the economic and political instability of the last two years, the most potentially
far reaching was State President P. W. Botha's announcement that citizenship would be restored' to South African blacks. 2 In September 1985,
Botha affirmed that some form of citizenship would be extended to all
South Africans.3 Finally, on July 2, 1986, the South African government
passed The Restoration of South African Citizenship Act."
Unfortunately, the new South African legislation grants only the possibility of dual nationality in the guise of "citizenship." This disembowled "citizenship" extends only to a limited number of blacks, and
then only if the individual affirmatively applies. Meanwhile, South Africa plans to continue to denationalize blacks. Apparently unbeknownest
to leaders of the United States,5 South Africa's new citizenship policy
1. The first intimation of a possible shift in South Africa's policy of denying citizenship to all blacks came in January 1985, when Executive State President P. W. Botha
established a Special Cabinet Committee to consider and recommend changes in the citizenship policy. See SoUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, col. 15 (January
25, 1985). On April 19, 1985, President Botha stated that "[tihe Government does not
regard the loss of South African citizenship to be the inevitable result of a national state
becoming independent." SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, col. 3813
(April 19, 1985).
2. As used in this article, "blacks" refers to those classified in South Africa as Africans, as opposed to those classified as Colored or Indians.
3.

DIRECTORATE LIAISON AND INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE PRESIDENT

W. Botha DMS at the Congress of
the National Party,Bloemfontein (Sept. 11, 1985) [hereinafter September Statement by
P. W. Botha].
4. No. 73 (S. Afr. 1986), reprintedin STAATSKOERANT VAN DIE REPUBLICK VAN
SUID-AFRIKA [REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA GOVERNMENT GAZETTE], July 2, 1986, at
3 (effective July 1, 1986) [hereinafter Restoration of South African Citizenship Act].
This new legislation did not get much immediate attention in the United States or international press, perhaps due to the continued violence in South Africa under the most
recently imposed state of emergency.
5. In major policy speeches made weeks after the new South African citizenship legislation, both President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz accepted
the legislation at face value, as restoring citizenship to all black South Africans. This, the
legislation clearly does not do. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
ENDING APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA, CURRENT POLICY No. 853 (July 22, 1986)
OF SOUTH AFRICA, Statement by State PresidentP.
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aims at the apotheosis of apartheid (an Afrikaans word meaning "apartness" or "separateness"). Consequently, citizenship is the issue most crucial to South Africa's future. For over a decade, the South African government imaginatively, but invidiously, has conceived of black
"homelands" or "reserves" as progressively becoming "independent
states."' All blacks inside and outside these states who even remotely are
affiliated with the states have been deprived of South African citizenship
and nationality. They then have been made citizens and nationals of an
"independent state." No member of the international community other
than South Africa has recognized any of these putatively "independent"
states.
Millions of blacks born in South Africa under this policy, as well as
their children born after independence - even those born in urban areas
of South Africa - thus became aliens in the land of their birth.7 Aliens
are subject to deportation at any time if the whim of the executive so
dictates." Until this year, the ultimate goal of the government has been
the creation of a residual all-white9 South Africa in which no black had
any claim to the political rights of a citizen. As articulated by Dr. C. P.
Mulder, former Minister of "Bantu Administration and Development:"
[I]f our policy is taken to its full logical conclusion as far as the black
people are concerned, there will not be one black man with South Africa
citizenship. .

.

.[E]very black man in South Africa will eventually be

(speech of President Reagan) ("Citizenship, wrongly stripped away, has been restored to
nearly 6 million blacks"); BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U. S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE
U.S. APPROACH TO SOUTH AFRICA, CURRENT POLICY No. 854 (July 23, 1986) (speech
of Secretary Shultz).

6. The entire process of denationalization is analyzed carefully in Dugard, South
Africa's "Independent" Homelands: An Exercise in Denationalization, 10 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 11 (1980).
7. Aliens Act, No. 1 (S. Afr. 1937), defines an alien as "a person who is not a South
African citizen." Id., § 1. According to the Black Sash, a public interest organization in
South Africa, approximately nine million people have lost their citizenship through the
denationalization process.

THE BLACK SASH, WORKING NOTES FOR ADVICE OFFICES:
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, RESTORATION OF CITIZENSHIP 3

(1986) (South African publication on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational
Law). Other sources estimate the number as closer to ten million. See Wash. Post, July

28, 1986, at A13, col. 3.
8. See Aliens Act § 8, No. 1 (S. Afr. 1937); Admission of Persons to the Republic
Regulation Act 16, No. 59 (S.Afr. 1972); infra text accompanying notes 109-23.
9.

At the very least, the Government has attempted to create a "nonblack" South

Africa by including Indians and Coloreds as citizens with rights subordinate to the white
majority, a status which the Government is now offering - in an even more subordinate
form - to some blacks.
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accommodated in some independent new state in this honourable way and
there will no longer be a moral obligation on this Parliament to accommodate these people politically.' 0
Under the new legislation, the goal of the government has shifted only
slightly; now the architects of grand apartheid merely want to limit the
number of blacks in "white" South Africa to as few as possible.
South Africa's citizenship policy has deep historical roots. The policy
springs from historical uses of citizenship to deny certain persons civil
rights, uses which inform methods of "influx control" traditionally employed by successive white governments to exclude blacks from white areas. Now the justification for racial discrimination has changed from the
baasskap approach of white domination to the new ideology of separate
development. The retention of the Group Areas Act"' and the homelands/"independent state" structure indicates the government's commitment to separate development. The implications of racial discrimination
are at least as bad under this new ideology as under the old, and quite
probably are worse. According to the ideology of separate development,
each racial subgroup will reach its utmost potential by preserving racial
purity through geographic isolation. The "areas" and "states" to which
most blacks are relegated are the most arid, economically depressed and
poverty-stricken regions in the country. To these tragic conditions, one
may add the tragedy of a person forcibly removed from familiar surroundings of home to a strange and unpleasant land. In addition to being
equitably flawed, the new citizenship policy is logically and legally
flawed.
Section II of this article elaborates the history of the modern concept
of citizenship, its significance, and its gradual convergence with the international law of human rights. Section III traces the history of South
Africa's citizenship policy, describing its place in the ideology of separate
development, its manifestation in "independent states," and its culmination in the new "restored citizenship" or "orderly urbanisation" touted
by the South African government. Section III also describes the expected
10.

SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES,

col. 579 (Feb. 7, 1978). The

South African Government has, if anything, retreated to this position in reaction to recent United States sanctions and in preparation for the election to be held May 6, 1987.
See Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 2, 1986, at 1, col. 2. The new sanctions prohibit
"4new investment" in South Africa (including loans to the private sector, but excluding
most purchases and sales of goods), most new loans to the government of South Africa,
and U.S. Government contracting for goods or services from South African "parastatal"
organizations. See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, §§
207, 305, 310, 315 (1986).
11. No. 36 (S. Afr. 1966).
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implementation of the new citizenship policy and its effects on the lives
of the individuals involved. Section IV considers domestic and international legal methods of challenging the policy. This article concludes that
while use of both approaches might not give rise immediately to recognition of effective citizenship, it might achieve extension of nationality to
all blacks. Concrete benefits to blacks will result even if the legal challenges prove unsuccessful. If the South African Government ever gives
substance to the rhetoric of citizenship, blacks could achieve significant
political rights; therefore domestic and international litigation constitute
the best means of challenging the Government's policy.
II.

THE CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP

A.

The Basic Concept

Citizenship has special legal, psychological and political value. It is a
domestic law concept entitling the citizen to all of the rights, and binding
12
the citizen to all of the duties, of members of the body politic. It implies full membership in a state or political community.1" The very word
"citizenship" derives from the Latin noun civitas, which refers to a
member of a city. In short, the concept evokes a communitarian ideal of
free and equal civic participation based on political organization.14 The
12. Accord RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(REVISED) § 214 Reporters' note 6 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT FOR. REL. LAW, T.D. No. 6]; see P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (2d ed. rev. 1979); Koessler, "Subject," "Citizen," "Na-

tional," and "PermanentAllegiance," 56 YALE L.J. 58, 63 (1946). Today the "ancient
concept" of citizenship "generally entails full political rights including the right to vote
and participate in political processes." RESTATEMENT FOR. REL. LAW, T.D. No. 6,

supra, § 214 Reporters' note 6. In states where the Roman conception of nationality as a
personal relationship instead of a territorial link exists, it is appropriate to speak of the
terms as meaning the same thing. But more frequently the different meanings of citizenship and nationality are confused.
13. The crucial link between citizenship (as membership in a community) and liberty is called to mind by political philosophers ranging from Aristotle, whose polis was
organized in order to actualize the individual citizen's potential, to Mill, whose idea of
negative liberty held that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others.

.

." J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 120 (1948). Despite the archaic qualification of

community by "civilised," the fact remains that social contract theorists of various persuasions have viewed membership in a given community as entitling one to certain rights.
The positive liberty sketched by Marx and other idealist philosophers is even more on
point.
14. See, e.g., the number of articles dealing with citizenship in the recent Michigan
Law Review symposium on "Law and Community," 84 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1986).
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increasing recognition of human rights since World War II, inspired by
the same ideal, has given the domestic law concept of citizenship new
international law overtones.
Nationality, by contrast, is an international law concept denoting the
connection between an individual and a state that results in, for example,
diplomatic protection. 5 Whereas "nationality" conveys a sense of belonging to a state, "citizenship" usually conveys the richer sense of belonging to a community. In many ways, denationalization more accurately describes the process of creating new "nations" and "nationalities"
to which blacks in South Africa have been assigned.16 Blacks persisently
have been defined as nonmembers of the South African community.
While the "independent states" are conceived by the South African
and "independent state" governments as sovereign states in international
law, the legislation involved1" speaks solely of "citizenship." Clearly,
however, South Africa's new approach actually offers the alternative of
dual nationality to those blacks who have been deprived of South African citizenship and given "citizenship" (and "nationality") of the independent states. Thus, the failure of the legislation to draw the distinction
is not a sufficient reason in itself for preferring "citizenship" to "nationality" as the relevant term; but the relevance of citizenship to the present
and future civil and political rights of blacks - that is, their status in
domestic municipal law - is a sufficient reason.
B.

The History of Citizenship

Although citizenship in its modern form is a recent phenomenon, the
concept has ancient roots. Centuries ago the city states of Greece distinguished citizens from slaves and aliens. Among other rights, citizens, unlike slaves and aliens, had the right to vote, to speak at Assembly 8 and
to demand defense or public assistance from the government. Citizens
15. Koessler, supra note 12, at 63; P. WEIs, supra note 12, at 4-5.
16. Most of the literature thus urges that "nationality" is the more appropriate concept. See Dean, A Citizen of Transkei, 11 COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 57 (1978);

Dugard, supra note 6, at 21; Heyne, A Transkeian Citizen of South African Nationality, 26 TYDSKRIF VIR HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINS-HOLLANDSE REG. 44 (1963).
17. The National States Citizenship Act, § 3, No. 26 (S. Afr. 1970) (formerly known
as the "Bantu" States Citizenship Act and later as the "Black" States Citizenship Act).
See also the various independence-conferring statutes: Status of Transkei Act, No. 100
(S. Afr. 1976); Status of Bophuthatswana Act, No. 89 (S.Afr. 1977); Status of Venda
Act, No. 107 (S.Afr. 1979); Status of Ciskei Act, No. 110 (S. Afr. 1981); and The
Restoration of South African Citizenship Act, supra note 4.
18. That is, the classic Athenian Assembly at which all citizens had the right to vote
and raise matters for public consideration.
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also had many, and often correlative duties including jury service, military service, and the duty to vote and attend the Assembly.19 Significantly, however, the earliest concept of citizenship entailed more than
merely negative liberty. A Greek citizen "had positive claims against the
state, not merely the right not to be interfered with in the private
sphere." 20 Stoic philosophy, with its emphasis on the brotherhood of
man, influenced the extension of the idea of citizenship from the few to
the many.2 1 The expansion of the Roman Empire extended citizenship
further still.22 With the rise of feudal structures in the middle ages, the
concept of citizenship lay relatively dormant and rights attenuated severely. 23 Once modern states emerged after the middle ages, however, the
concept of a "citizen" owing allegiance to a state gradually replaced the
notion of a "subject" owing allegiance to a feudal lord and, ultimately,
the king.2 4 Only in the nineteenth century did the idea of expatriation voluntary relinquishment of citizenship after it is possessed - gain currency among the community of nations.25 Until that time, the principal
of jus soli apparently meant that one would always be a citizen of a
country of one's birth no matter where one resided.28
Citizenship always has been thought of as conferring a unique status,
a sense of belonging that also afforded certain concrete advantages. Thus,
when Rome offered citizenship to members of the Latin confederacy, the
Latins grasped the citizenship as protection against arbitrary violence by
27
Roman officials.
A person may acquire citizenship by birth or by naturalization. All

19. See, e.g., M. I. FINLEY, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN ANCIENT GREECE 83
(1981).
20. Id. at 92.
21. See, e.g., 1 F. COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed. 1955).
22. By way of the Constitutio Antoniniana, "the most famous legal measure of antiquity," Caesar's nephew Octavian (later the Emperor Augustus), in 28 B.C., began a
subtle policy of enfranchisement, sponsored by Augustus, which increased the number of
Roman citizens considerably. M. GRANT, HISTORY OF ROME 247 (1978). The Roman
Emperor Caracalla granted citizenship to all free men (nonslaves) in the Empire in 212
A.D. Id. at 382. He intended to increase revenue from taxation but incidentally promoted liberty and equality.
23. "Citizens" in the middle ages were those who lived in the communal associations
that were "towns"; consequently, these citizens developed relative autonomy from feudal
structures. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1085-87 (1980);
see also Koessler, supra note 12, at 59-60 nn. 9-10.
24. Koessler, supra note 12, at 59-60.
25. See infra note 51.
26. Koessler, supra note 12, at 72 n.88.
27. M. GRANT, HISTORY OF ROME 55 (1978).
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persons born in the United States are automatically citizens, according to
the United States Constitution. 28 Historically, though, birth in a country
has not automatically conferred the legal status of citizenship. The rule
of jus soli, or law of place, confers citizenship on a child born within the
boundaries of a certain country regardless of the nationality of the child's
parents.2 1 The rule of jus sanguinis,or law of blood, confers citizenship
on the child according to the nationality of the child's parents.3 0 Some
countries, in order to maximize individual choice, emphasize one rule
but follow versions of both."'
Citizenship as a concept developed from pragmatic, as opposed to
moral, concerns of protecting the power and privilege of the elite. The
rule of jus sanguinis, in particular, smacks of status distinctions based
on race or blood of the sort that international law increasingly disfavors.
Yet it too served the pragmatic purposes of allowing a child to keep the
nationality or citizenship of its parent, and allowing others a choice of
nationality or citizenship based on their birth or parents. But citizenship
was historically very exclusive. In ancient Greece, freedom of the Greeks
was "severely restricted by law in any activity that entailed the introduction of new members into the closed circle of the citizen-body."3 2 Ancient
Rome also used citizenship as a tool to distinguish the Roman citizen
(dvis) from the alien or Roman subject who did not possess citizenship
(peregrinus), a category which grew as Rome annexed territory
abroad.33 Pragmatic concerns continue to underlie the enormous discretion that nations retain over who can be made a citizen.3 4 But this is not

28. Citizenship in the classical Greek polis was acquired by birth in all but exceptional cases. See, e.g., M. I. FINLEY, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN ANCIENT GREECE 79
(1981). The rule of place of birth became part of the United States Constitution when
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868. In 1898, the United States Supreme
Court confirmed that Congress could not deny citizenship to any person born within the
boundaries of the United States, regardless of the nationality or citizenship of the child's
parents. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
29. Koessler, supra note 12, at 72 n. 88.
30. Id.
31. See id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3)-(7) (1982).
32. M. I. FINLEY, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN ANCIENT GREECE 87 (1981). "In the
middle of the fifth century the Athenians adopted a law restricting citizenship to the
legitimate children of marriages in which both parents were themselves of citizen stock."

M. I. FINLEY,

THE ANCIENT GREEKS

40 (1964). Ancient Greek citizenship was so ex-

clusive that no routine naturalization procedure existed; formal action by the sovereign
assembly was necessary before an outsider could become a citizen of Athens. Id.
33. M. GRANT, HISTORY OF ROME 104 (1978).
34. Consider, for example, legislation to restrict the automatic right to French citizenship, which has been proposed (but not yet enacted) in response to increasing an-
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to say that today a party in power may legitimately reduce citizenship to
a mere tool; constraints imposed by domestic and international law exist.
Because the rights and duties established by the recognition of citizenship are not universal across societies, problems arise. Realistically, governments must have substantial discretion not only over who they make
citizens, but also over the cluster of rights inhering in the particular form
of citizenship recognized by that country. Originally, the rights attaching
to citizenship were thought to be the sole province of sovereign states.
Nevertheless, international norms of liberty and equality increasingly
give content to the modern concept of citizenship.
C.

The Modern Meaning of Citizenship

The increasing recognition since 1945 that a binding code of human
rights exists in international law has strengthened the concept of citizenship as a cross-societal vessel containing significant human rights.3 5 In
fact, citizenship provides a conceptual link between the outdated idea
that human rights was strictly a matter between an individual and a
state,"6 and the modern idea that basic rights which properly may be
made the subject of international law exist in all individual-state relationships. Rights of citizenship are not only a subset of those broader
human rights recognized by international law; increasingly, the rights of
a nation's citizens are identical to the human rights guaranteed by international law.
The law of state responsibility for injury to aliens developed because
injury by one state to the nationals of another state could threaten relations between states.3 7 Writing in 1946, a leading commentator on nationality and citizenship dismissed the possibility that an international
law concept like nationality could be a vehicle for specific rights.3 8 Yet
now, international law extends to treatment of citizens as well:
It reflects general acceptance that every individual should have rights in
his or her society which the state should recognize, respect and ensure. . . . It reflects general acceptance, too, that how a state treats inditiforeign sentiment in France. E.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
35. See, e.g., P. SIEGHART, THE LAWFUL RIGHTS OF MANKIND (1985).

36. See Humphrey, The InternationalLaw of Human Rights in the Middle Twentieth Century, in R. LiLLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW &

37.

See, e.g.,

STATES (REVISED)

PoLicy 1 (1979).

RESTATEMENT

RESTATEMENT FOR. REL. LAW,

38.

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

OF THE UNITED

Part VII introductory note (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982) [hereinafter

T.D. No. 3].

Koessler, supra note 12, at 75-76.
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vidual human beings, including its own citizens, in respect of their human
rights, is not the state's own business alone and therefore exclusively
within its "domestic jurisdiction," but is a matter of international concern
and a proper subject for regulation by international law. 9

Thus, a move toward a definition of universal citizenship in a world
community has accompanied the human rights movement.
Whether or not each nation in the world labels the members of its
community "citizens," this observation recognizes that something like the
concept of citizenship exists or should exist in every nation of the world.
Additionally, the observation goes further to assert that as a normative
matter citizenship should be defined liberally to encourage the reciprocal
recognition of rights of states and individuals at the heart of international
law. Customary international law establishes certain minimal equal
rights of citizens that stem from the concept itself and that nations cannot legally abridge. While in one sense synonymous with "human
rights," these distinctive rights of citizens in another sense relate precisely to participation in political decisionmaking of the sort denied
South African blacks.
1. The Right of Political Participation
Within the class of citizens, the right to vote often has been limited,
historically, to those who met certain age, sex, property or literacy qualifications. The right to the franchise, or a voice in government, however,
is another right that states should grant citizens unless justifications for
40
limitations based on age, or some other rational criteria exist.
39. RESTATEMENT FOR. REL. LAW, T.D. No. 3, supra note 37, at 138. The South
African government, of course, is not alone in "discomfiture" at the idea that international law extends to the rights of citizens against their own governments. More skeptical
academicians, lay people, and even the Reagan Administration have been accused of feeling the same way. E.g., D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110, 1111 (1982).
40. Rawls' principle of equal liberty under the constitution, or the principle of equal
participation requires that:
all citizens are to have an equal right to take part in, and to determine the outcome of, the constitutional process that establishes the laws with which they are to
comply. Justice as fairness begins with the idea that where common principles are
necessary and to everyone's advantage, they are to be worked out from the viewpoint of a suitably defined initial situation of equality in which each person is
fairly represented. The principle of participation transfers this notion from the
original position to the constitution as the highest-order system of social rules for
making rules. If the state is to exercise a final and coercive authority over a certain
territory, and if it is in this way to affect permanently men's prospects in life, then
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Although the original Greek concept of citizenship included both the
right and the duty to vote, the Romans first conceived the possibility of
separating the franchise from citizenship in an "ingenious" arrangement
designed to contain Latin political power after the breakup of the Latin
League in 338 B.C.
Rome granted the male inhabitants of this category of city a new sort of
right, citizenship without franchise (dvitas sine suffragio). This was, in
effect, a partial, halfway Roman citizenship, by virtue of which the men
of these places, while not normally given the "public" right to vote in
Rome's election (which they could in any case rarely have exercised since
they lived too far away), were granted "private" rights, notably the right
to enter into contracts with a Roman according to Roman law (commercium) and the entitlement to marry41 a Roman without forfeiting inheritance of paternity rights (conubium).
Because of the historical context, and the modifications in the civic
duties of military service and taxation allowed these halfway Roman citizens, the Latins "escaped the slur of inferior status""' and the Roman
mechanism of sQcial control worked. This use of citizenship as a means
of social control relates more to early development of international law,
because it accommodates relations between what were truly distinct international political entities, than to domestic law segregation of portions
of a nation's populace. A similar example comes from Senegal, West
Africa. There, France qualified and revoked French citizenship in the
years immediately preceding the outbreak of World War I. Blaise
Diagne, the first African elected to the position of Representative from
Senegal in the French Chamber of Deputies, secured a full and complete
restoration of citizenship for the Senegalese, basing his legal arguments
on the need for blacks' votes to protect their interests. According to one

the constitutional process should preserve the equal representation of the original
position to the degree that this is practicable.
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 221-22 (1971). The right of political participation
recognized in the Western liberal tradition in which Rawls is writing, and in which
South Africa very much would like to place itself, of course, is implemented imperfectly
even in states authentically in the tradition. E.g., Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)
(Indians denied right to vote because of effect of tribes on their U.S. citizenship); Dred
Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (1857) (black slaves held to be nationals eligible for diplomatic protection, but not citizens). But see Basson, Representation in South African
ConstitutionalLaw, 101 S.AFR. L.J. 142, 155 (1984) (finding a right of universal suffrage in South African constitutional law).
41. M. GRANT, HISTORY OF ROME 58 (1978).

42. Id. at 59.
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commentator, the inhabitants felt a renewed "sense of dignity and selfrespect." 4 3 The "universal suffrage" movement of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries went even further toward establishing the
unreasonableness of denying the franchise based on criteria such as race
or sex. Historically, however, citizenship almost always has implied the
right to vote, unless social perceptions resulted in the denial of the
franchise to some subset of citizens on grounds of some legal incapacity.44 With the concurrent explosion of citizenship and suffrage in the
twentieth century, it is hard to deny that the right to vote and even hold
office is part of the modern meaning of citizenship.
The right to free and equal access to the courts is, in addition to the
franchise, also encompassed in the citizen's right to political participation.45 South Africa denies residents of "independent states" in South
Africa the right of equal access to South African courts:
People who live in residential areas which form part of constitutionally
independent 'homelands' have been found to be peregrini in South Africa.
This is so even where they live in a residential area such as Mdantsane,
which is geographically part of East London but constitutionally part of
the Ciskei. As a consequence, they have been required to furnish46security
for costs when instituting action against a South African incola.
As international law models of due process as well as the facts of world
history suggest, the right to citizenship is "limited in its value" without
47
the right of free and equal access to independent courts.
2.

The Right Not to be Deprived Arbitrarily of Citizenship

Another special human right attaching to citizens is the right not to be
deprived arbitrarily of citizenship. One element of citizenship and the

43.

R. W. JULY, A HISTORY OF THE AFRICAN PEOPLE 445 (1970); see also id. at

443-45; Ancel, The French Law of Naturalization, 10 TUL. L. REV. 231, 234-36
(1936).
44. The outrageous historical denial of the vote to women in this country (until passage of the nineteenth amendment) does not disprove the historical connection between
citizenship and the franchise. Unfortunately, women were branded legally incompetent
in this area, along with such citizens as children, convicted felons, or certain mentally
retarded individuals.
45. Address by A.J. Milne, Annual General Meeting of Lawyers for Human Rights
(Aug. 6, 1983), reprinted in Equal Access to Free & Independent Courts, 100 S. AFR.
L.J. 681 (1983).
46. Budlender, A Common Citizenship?, I S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 210, 216 (1985)
(footnotes omitted).

47.

Id.
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freedom of equality it traditionally has implied is the difficulty of losing
citizenship. The earliest citizens, in classical Athens, could not be enslaved publicly or privately (except according to the peculiar law of ransom)." 8 While special legislation providing for naturalization or cession
of territory may grant citizenship, instances of wholesale deprivations of
citizenship by legislation without the consent of the populace are rare,
and of dubious legality. 49 This is especially true of deprivations based
explicitly or implicitly on racial factors, which would violate international norms against racial discrimination. 5"
Beyond voluntary expatriation, 51 nations have recognized ways in

48. M. I. FINLEY, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN ANCIENT GREECE 148 (1981).
49. While instances of denationalization have occurred before, after the Bolshevik
Revolution or the Fascist takeover in Italy, for example, the most directly analogous
precedent to South Africa's action, the Nazi divisions of citizenship and denationalization
of the Jews under, respectively, the Nuremburg laws of 1935 and Hitler's decree of
1941, has been roundly criticized as violating fundamental rights. Garner, Recent German Nationality Legislation, 30 AM. J. INT'L L. 96, 99 (1936) (although probably
within the legislative competence of domestic law, statute is disapproved as racial discrimination and violation of fundamental rights); Mann, The Present Validity of Nazi
Nationality Laws, 89 LAW Q. REV. 194, 199 (1973) (on natural law grounds). The
1935 laws divided the population into two classes based on possession of German or
Jewish racial qualities. The Staatsanehorigen,or nationals of the Reich were entitled to
some protection, many duties and few rights. The Reichsburger,or Citizen of the Reich,
was entitled to full potential rights based on possession of racial qualities. "In this report
it is believed that the new German law is without precedent in the nationality legislation
of modern civilized states." Garner, suprd, at 98.
The other primary documented instances spring from the experience of colonialism,
where imperial citizenship was taken away upon the grant of independence. Citizenship
in the colonial context was, of course, a desired source of valuable rights. Presumably,
the existence of popular consent in genuine grants of independence to colonial countries
distinguishes such relinquishments of citizenship from the deprivation at issue in South
Africa. South Africa's deprivation of extant citizenship also may be distinguished, for
example, from the refusal of a state such as the United States to extend citizenship to
inhabitants of "unincorporated" territories over which the United States has exerted authority. See McGovney, Our Non-Citizen Nationals, Who Are They?, 22 CALIF. L.
REV. 593 (1934).
Because of traditional state discretion over nationality, some doubt exists whether denationalization alone violates international law, arbitrary deprivation of nationality
(based on race, for example) raises more questions. See H. VAN PANHUYS, THE ROLE
OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

163 (1959). The present day rule of general

international law seems to be that discriminatorydenationalization is prohibited in international law - certainly on the basis of race, but probably also on the grounds of sex,
language or religion which are mentioned in the U.N. Charter. P. WEis, supra note 12,
at 125.
50. See infra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
51. The right of voluntary expatriation was first given to Americans by Congress in
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which citizenship or nationality can be lost as a penalty for conduct
which a government may consider as unbecoming of its citizens. In the
United States, for example, a citizen was formerly subject to automatic
expatriation for committing treason, taking an oath of allegiance to another country, or serving in another country's armed forces. Now a
United States citizen can lose citizenship only by voluntarily renouncing
it.5 2 South Africa still has provisions similar to the former United States
law.5 3 Statelessness therefore has occasionally resulted from a person's
renunciation of citizenship or a homeland withdrawing citizenship or na.tionality as a punishment of some sort.5 4 The lowest common denominator among these legal means of losing citizenship, however, is that all
involve a crime, or some other voluntary action by the individual whose
citizenship is at risk, which amounts to a breach of the bond of community which is citizenship. International law today recognizes as illegal
any deprivation of citizenship or nationality on arbitrary grounds, such
as racial features over which an individual has no control. 55
Inherent within the modern concept of citizenship, therefore, are general concepts of liberty and equality56 as well as specific rights such as
the right to political participation and the right not to be deprived arbitrarily of citizenship. The recent rhetoric of the South African govern-

1868, elaborated in 1907, and carried through in the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481-89 (1982). An individual born in the United States can now
only lose United States citizenship by voluntarily renouncing it. See, e.g., Afroyim v.
Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). South Africa
provides for a similar right of voluntary expatriation, The South African Citizenship
Act, §§ 15-16, No. 44 (S. Afr. 1949).
52. See supra note 50.
53. South African Citizenship Act § 19, No. 44 (S. Afr. 1949).
54. See P. WEis, supra note 12, at 118.
55. See supra note 49.
56. For this reason, Rawls assumes equal citizenship as a constituent condition of his
just society, and writes that "equal citizenship defines a general point of view. The
problems of adjudicating among the fundamental liberties are settled by reference to it."
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 97 (1971). Daniel Bell describes the legitimacy of the
policy in similar terms:
The implicit condition is the idea of equality, that all men are to have an equal
[T]he idea
voice in [the consensus which forges the consent of the governed] ....
of citizenship which embodies this conception has in the past 100 years been expanded to include equality not only in the public sphere, but in all other dimensions of social life as well - equality before the law, equality of civil rights,
equality of opportunity, even equality of results - so that a person is able to
participate fully, as a citizen, in the society.
D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 11 (1976).
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ment rings with new affirmations of the ideal of equal rights. 57 Yet
South Africa continues to deny equal rights because its concept of citizenship differs so radically from the modern concept of citizenship outlined above. Not only has South African citizenship been taken away
arbitrarily and restored selectively, but race as well as citizenship persists
58
as a qualification for the franchise.
III.

THE EVOLUTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENSHIP POLICY

Blacks have never been full citizens of South Africa in the sense employed in the domestic municipal law of either South Africa or the
United States. Citizenship, as discussed above, usually refers to the status of an individual in terms of state civil and political rights. Yet the
tradition of racial prejudice against blacks in South Africa, perhaps combined with the keen sense of Afrikaner cultural identity which emerged
especially after the two Boer wars at the turn of this century, has persistently resulted in the denial of citizenship to blacks. White South Africans
have been unwilling or unable, in general, to recognize the communitarian bond with blacks which would form the essence of citizenship.
The lack of a sense of community among blacks and whites in South
Africa stems in part from the lack of a national constitution symbolizing
common political ideals. Citizenship in the American constitutional
scheme serves as a "fellowship which binds people together. '5' Attachment to "the principles of the Constitution" is the essence of this fellowship.6 0 Such attachment if, of course, impossible for blacks in South Africa as presently constituted. Nevertheless, it is unreal to say that blacks,
whites, and the other races in South Africa do not form an actual "community." Empirically, the close relationship in South African blacks and
whites is communal, in the sense that black and white alike has each
used the relationship to define the other's sense of self. This remains true
57. See, e.g., Remarks of Dr. P.G.J. Koornhof, then Minister of Cooperation and
Development, in 1980: "We can be, and are, well on the way to achieving [in South
Africa] equality for all people before the law and equal chances and opportunities."
Financial Times, Feb. 1, 1980, at 1; see also LIAISON SERVICES OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING, A SUMMARY OF THE WHITE PAPER ON URBANISATION 3 (1985) (government reaffirms its commitment to respect

human dignity and implement "a democratic dispensation.
opportunities for everybody")
URBANISATION].
58. FROM THE

[hereinafter SUMMARY

. .

with equal treatment and

OF THE WHITE PAPER ON

DIARIES OF FEIx FRANKFURTER 211-12 (U. Lash ed. 1975).
59. Id.; see also Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and CulturalIdentiy,
64 N.C.L. Rev. 303 (1986).
60. See Republic of South Africa Constitution Act § 52, No. 110 (S. Afr. 1983).
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despite the serious conflicts over values in South Africa. Racist whites
need to open themselves up to the real community that exists, even if it
exists as a result of interdependence, shared history and geography more
than shared values. In this way, shared values might ultimately be
achieved.
Although the laws and the franchise of the early Cape (under British
influence from 1806 onwards) were formally color blind, the franchise in
the Orange Free State and the South African Republic (Transvaal) was
limited to citizeng. Unfortunately, citizenship was limited to whites.6"
Upon union in 1910, the Cape retained its qualified franchise based on
economic and educational requirements, but the northern provinces continued to limit "burgerskap," or full citizenship, to whites. As the Cape
became more legally integrated with the rest of South Africa, especially
under the Nationalist Party of 1948, even this franchise for blacks became separate representation and eventually was eliminated altogether.
The new constitution approved in late 1983 still excludes blacks.6 2 In
light of conventional or legal standards, blacks have never been more
than second-class citizens in South Africa."
A.

Influx Control

Influx control laws have substantially influenced current citizenship
policy. Influx control in the form of legislation designed to exclude
blacks from colonized white areas has existed in South Africa for centuries. What became known as "the pass laws" required blacks to have a
pass to enter the Cape Colony as early as 1797. Thus, severe restrictions
on freedom of movement existed long before blacks were relegated to
"independent states." Some pass laws allowed cheap black labor to remain in the colony as the interests of the white populace dictated, but the
history of influx control is primarily exclusionary, rather than inclusionary." Although the government announced the repeal of the pass laws
and the Urban Areas Act on April 22, 1986,5 the Group Areas Act 66
61.

See H. R.

HAHLO &

E.

KAHN, SOUTH AFRICA: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS

74-76, 84-110 (1960).
62. Republic of South Africa Constitution Act § 52, No. 110 (S. Afr. 1983).
63. See A. SACHS, JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 63, 70 (1973); accord J. DUGARD,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 22 (1978).
64. See Budlender, Incorporation and Exclusion: Recent Developments in Labour
Law and Influx Control, 1 S. AFR. J. HuM. RTs. 3, 3-4 (1985).
65. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
66. No. 36 (S. Afr. 1966); see supra note 11 and accompanying text. The South
African Government has made clear that "existing measures with regard to separate
living areas for the various population groups in towns and cities will still be observed."
LAWS AND CONSTITUTION
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and the current citizenship policy of homelands and independent states
continue in force. The current citizenship policy carries the exclusionary
imperative to an extreme. Influx control reaches its peak when those the
executive deals with have been classified and treated as "aliens" under
inclusionary asthe citizenship policy. Yet, the citizenship policy retains 67
pects in the form of an expanded migrant labor system.
Land reservation has been a key to influx control and remains a foundation of South Africa's citizenship policy. The legislative structure of
influx control established prescribed (usually urban) and nonprescribed
(rural farmland and mines) areas within residual "white" South Africa.6e Separate "states" were a logical outgrowth of these separate
"areas".
The concept of separate territories hearkens back at least as far as the
"Bantu" Land Act of 1913," which set aside about seven percent of the
country for black ownership and occupation, and the "Bantu" Land and
Trust Act of 1936,70 which increased the total area to thirteen percent of
the country. Black acquisition of land outside these territories was prohibited. These reservations of land have been called various names as
separate development has proceeded: reserves, Bantustans, homelands,
territories, and now "independent" and nonindependent states. The land
reservations have resulted in only patchwork units, and an "independent" state is often discontinuous and fragmented.
B.

The Evolution of Separate Development

In 1948, the Nationalist party was elected on a platform of apartheid,
but not the sophisticated "separate development" form of apartheid dominant today. The 1948 form of apartheid was a crude baasskap71 form,
premised on white domination. With this mandate, the Nationalists proceeded to intensify and broaden racial discrimination through a spate of
repressive statutes. Implicit within the baasskap approach, however, was
always a germ of separate development. The Reservation of Separate
Amenities Act of 195372 which set in place the "separate but unequal"

supra note 57, at 3.
67. See Budlender, supra note 64, at 6.
68. See Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No. 25 (S. Afr. 1945), repealed by
The Abolition of Influx Control Act of 1986, No. - (S. Afr. 1986) (effective July 1,
1986).
69. No. 27 (S. Afr. 1913).
70. No. 18 (S. Afr. 1936).
71. Literally, "boss-ship."
72. No. 49 (S. Afr. 1953). The long-expected intent to repeal this anachronistic legSUMMARY OF THE WHITE PAPER ON URBANISATION,
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doctrine of South Africa at the very time the United States Supreme
Court"3 was preparing to repudiate the "separate but equal" doctrine, 7 '
illustrates this plan of separate development. Even as the international
community edged away from the sort of racial discrimination exposed
after Nazi Germany's atrocities in World War II, South Africa continued to emphasize separate development.
The Bantu Authorities Act of 195171 approved tribal authorities for
the homelands, and further steps toward self-government occurred during the remainder of the 1950s. The South African government paid and
appointed black chiefs to replace white magistrates. The government
eliminated white representation of blacks in South Africa's Parliament,
partly because it did not promote the goal of preparing for black territorial self-government. Near the close of the decade, Prime Minister Dr.
H. F. Verwoerd, the late architect of South Africa's current citizenship
policy, directed the passage of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government
Act of 1959." At the time of this act's passage, Verwoerd justified the
policy by appealing to the principle of self-determination present in the
United Nations Charter and the driving force of the emergent
decolonization movement. The new policy, said Verwoerd, was "in line
with the objects of the world at large."7 7
In the 1960s, South Africa granted Transkei the singular status of
becoming a "self-governing" territory with its own flag, national anthem,
and language (Xhosa). Black Transkeians received Transkeian "citizenship" (on explicitly racial grounds) but retained their South African citizenship. After this action, the pace of separate development slowed. Professor John Dugard explains the grant of self-government to only one
territory by South Africa's need to appease the international community
while the first South West Africa Cases were pending.78 After South Africa won a technical victory in the World Court,79 and Verwoerd died,

islation was confirmed by President P. W. Botha on October 1, 1986. See Wall St. J.,
Oct. 8, 1986, at 39, col. 2.
73. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
74. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), established the separate but equal doctrine repudiated by Brown.
75. No. 68 (S. Afr. 1951).
76. No. 46 (S. Afr. 1959).
77. SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, col. 6221 (May 20, 1959); see
Note, The Transkei:South Africa's Illegitimate Child, 12 NEw ENG. L. REv.585, 59899 (1977).
78. J. DUGARD, supra note 63, at 91.
79. South West African Cases, Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. 6.
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the impetus for granting self-government had disappeared.80
With the coming of detente with other African nations in the 1970s,
the South African legislature again appealed to the principle of self-determination by passing the "Bantu States" (now "National States") Citizenship Act of 1970.81 Section three of this act made all blacks not already citizens of self-governing territories into citizens of the territory to
which they were attached through birth, domicile, or cultural affiliation.
This determination of citizenship occurred without regard to whether
blacks had lived in the relevant area. Unlike later legislation, however,
this Act did not remove South African citizenship, and consequently
blacks did not notice the legislation because it did not cause them any
concrete disadvantages. The "Bantu Homelands" (now "National
States") Constitution Act 21 of 197182 issued each territory a constitution. In 1974, the self-governing territory of Transkei opted for "independence," which was officially granted in 1976. Of the ten ethnic homelands that remained constitutionally within South Africa, seven Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei, Lebowa, Gazankulu, QwaQwa, and
KwaZulu - had achieved self-government by 1977.
The South African government expected recognition for Transkei, but
the international community denied recognition. The United Nations
General Assembly condemned the grant of independence, a position later
affirmed by the Security Council. 3 Riots in Soweto and elsewhere in
South Africa in 1976 were one factor in refusing recognition, but the
primary justification for denying recognition was the broad reach of the
independence-conferring statute. It purported to extend Transkeian citizenship to individuals attached to Transkei only by the most remote and
tenuous link. Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei became independent
in 1977, 1979, and 1981 respectively, but the South African government
has given up any serious hopes that they will be accepted by the world
community. 4
Despite P. W. Botha's announcement in September 1985 that the government would discontinue the policy of stripping blacks of their citizen-

80. J. Dugard, supra note 6, at 14.
81. No. 26 (S. Afr. 1970).
82. No. 21 (S. Afr. 1971).
83. J. DUGARD, supra note 63, at 96.
84. On the other hand, South Africa's recent insistence, via Bophuthatswana's Internal Affairs Ministry, that nationals of neighboring states recognize Bophuthatswana and
obtain "visas," seems to indicate a new interest in securing external recognition for the
"independent state." Summary of World Broadcasts (British Broadcasting Corporation
Jan. 12, 1987). Such border restrictions also are designed to demonstrate the dependence
of truly independent neighboring states on South Africa.
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ship, South Africa's ideology of separate development remains strong.8 5
The curiosity of legal commentators about Botha's commitment to separate development through manipulation of citizenship 8" unfortunately
has been satisfied. Botha was elected in 1979. Venda became independent in 1979 and Ciskei in 1981. KwaNdebele was scheduled for independence in 1986; that it did not receive independence is wholly attributable to internal protest, as opposed to any action or attitude of the South
African government.8 7 Moreover, despite the dwindling legislative structure of petty apartheid (the many old laws of overtly discriminatory
white domination), grand apartheid (the new laws stressing separate development) remains intact. If there were any doubt, the evidence of the
new constitution, which co-opts Indians and Coloreds into mainstream
national politics but still manifests the idea of racial segregation (although in different houses of Parliament) and completely excludes
blacks, makes clear the degree to which separate development is fundamental. Many observers continue to link limited local government participation by blacks with the "independent states"; indeed local authorities
have only minor powers, subject to white authority. In short, the new
constitution considers members of the black majority to be primarily citizens of the homelands or "independent states," with no provision for
meaningful political accommodation in South Africa.
C. The Legislative Process of Independence
The statutes by which the South African Parliament has deprived ten
million people of citizenship by conferring independence on four homelands88 are substantially alike. Each statute concisely confers independence as of a certain date, and the territory's legislative assembly then

85. It is only the "purity" of the separate development ideology which has been
abandoned by the Botha government. Dugard, supra note 6, at 12.
86. Id. at 16-19.
87. KwaNdebele, established to supply labor to Pretoria, is a small homeland in
which four-fifths of the residents commute to "white" Pretoria daily. On May 8, 1986,
KwaNdebele's Chief Minister Simon Skosaha, elected by only 600 of the 400,000 residents, confirmed plans for a December 11, 1986 independence date. The Chief of the
Ndebele tribe, and the vast majority of KwaNdebele's citizens, opposed independence.
After seven months of violence in which 125 people were killed and one-half the territory's businesses closed, and which culminated in the car bomb murder of independence
supporter Piet Ntuli, the KwaNdebele assembly reversed its position and rejected independence on the grounds that it would deprive inhabitants of South African citizenship.
See Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 13, 1986, at 2, col. 1.
88. Transkei (1976); Bophuthatswana (1977); Venda (1979); and Ciskei (1981). See
the independence-conferring statutes cited in note 16, supra.
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enacts its own constitution. The constitutions vary somewhat, but basically are modeled on South Africa's constitution. Bophuthatswana's constitution contains a bill of rights based on the European Convention on
Human Rights, but the bill of rights has been granted only limited effectiveness since its inception.
After independence is conferred, each statute contains a "section 6"
which provides that
Every person falling in any of the categories of persons defined in Schedule B shall be a citizen of [the "independent state"] and shall cease to be a
South African citizen...
...
.No citizens of [the "independent state"] resident in the Republic at
the commencement of this Act shall, except as regards citizenship, forfeit
any existing rights, privileges or benefits by reason only of the other
provisions of this Act. 9
Although Schedule B differs slightly from statute to statute, it essentially lists the following ethno-linguistic categories of persons who become citizens of the "independent state" and "cease to be" South African
citizens:
1) Every person already designated as a citizen of the homeland under the
National States Citizenship Act of 1970 (which attributes citizenship
based on birth, language or cultural links with the homeland).
2) Every person born in or outside of the independent state of parents one
or both of whom were citizens of the homeland under the National States
Citizenship Act.
3) Every person who has been lawfully domiciled in the homeland for at
least five years.
4) Every South African citizen who is not already a citizen of another
homeland or this independent state, who speaks a language used by members of any tribe of the independent states, or any dialect of such
language.
5) Every South African citizen who is not already a citizen of another
homeland or this independent state who is (a) related to any one who
speaks a language of the independent state's tribes, or (b) "has identified
himself with any part of such population or is culturally or otherwise
associated with any member" of such population.
By focusing on language and culture, as well as birth, descent, and
domicile, the categories scrupulously avoid specific reference to race.
They even contain sweeping language which would deprive any person
89. See, e.g., Restoration of South African Citizenship Act § 6(1)-(2).
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who speaks a tribal language (or is oth-

erwise "identified" or "associated with" any member of the independent
state populace) of South African citizenship. The language is thus not
strictly limited to blacks, but the comprehensive reach of the statute is
geared primarily toward encompassing the racial characteristics which
have made blacks "citizens" of the homelands in the first place. In practice, implementing authorities have construed the statute as applying
only to blacks. No white (or Colored or Indian) South African has been
deprived of his or her citizenship under the independence-conferring
statutes.9 0 If Transkei can for a moment be spoken of as "independent,"
the Transkeian government put up some initial resistance to the attempt
of the South African government to confer Transkeian citizenship on the
millions of Xhosa speakers living within the Republic of South Africa.
The squatter settlement of Crossroads outside of Capetown, which contained many Xhosa speakers (labeled citizens of Transkei and Ciskei),
was consequently the temporary focus of a dispute with the Transkeian
government. The issue has become moot because South Africa has dealt
with the Crossroads settlement through a combination of repressive resettlement and conciliatory "negotiation" techniques, while continuing to
view citizens of Transkei as noncitizens of South Africa. In any event,
the function of the Transkeian government in conferring citizenship is
less objectionable than the attempt of the South African government to
deprive almost ten million people of citizenship and then selectively
make citizenship available again to only a small fraction of that
number. 9 1
In addition to the grant of independence, the statutes view the new
fictional entities created by South Africa as true sovereign states and full
actors on the scene of international relations. South Africa sees these entities as having rights to issue passports, hold elections and levy taxes. In
fact, the language of international law is even applied anomalously to
pre-"independence" relationships. The statutes provide that South African legislation and "agreements" in force in the homeland prior to independence continue in force. These pre-"independence" agreements between the "independent states" and the Republic of South Africa
continue as "international treaties," or "interstate agreements." These
define the practical responsibilities of South Africa and the "independent
states" in such areas as travel, transport, industrial development and defense. Because the agreements leave major power and influence in the
hands of South Africa, they also work to defeat the characterization of
90. Dugard, supra note 6, at 25.
91. See J. DUGARD, supra note 63, at 95.

1986]

SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENSHIP

the new states as "independent." Local authorities, however, are given at
least nominal authority to repeal or amend such legislation and treaties.
D. Citizenship "Restored"
The South African government is adept at using labels as a means of
social control. As in the United States under slavery, blacks are not "persons" subject to equal dignity and respect. Until 1979 South African law
excluded blacks from the statutory definition of "employee" and therefore they were not allowed to form unions under the Labour Relations
Act.9 2 The Blacks (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents)
Act of 1952"8 actually required blacks to carry separate passes containing information identifying them as a member of a particular ethnic
group with a certain tax and employment history. Similarly, the effect of
the Restoration of South African Citizenship Act is not exactly what its
title suggests.
President Botha had led black South Africans and the international
community to believe that all ten million blacks who had been dispossessed of South African citizenship would be restored to South African
citizenship." South African officials have made clear, however, that they
do not consider it possible or desirable to abolish the "independent
states," and have stated that the new legislation affects only 1.75 million
of those designated citizens of the independent states.9" These citizens are
92. Labour Relations Act, No. 28 (S. Afr. 1956), amended by Industrial Conciliation
Amendment Act, No. 94 (S. Afr. 1979).

93. No. 67 (S. Afr. 1952).
94.

The United States Administration apparently still accepts the thrust of this rep-

resentation as being true. See supra note 5.
95. South African Minister of Home Affairs Stoffel Botha and Director General of
the Home Affairs Ministry Gerrie Van Zyl confirmed this interpretation of the law in
statements widely reported in the international press in late July, 1986. See, e.g., Chris-

tian Science Monitor, July 29, 1986, at 1, col. 1; Wash. Post, July 28, 1986, at A13, col.
3; Johannesburg Sunday Star, July 27, 1986. Member of Parliament and Chief Re-

search Officer for the opposition Progressive Federal Party Nie Olivier accused the South
African Government of a "clear breach of an undertaking." Even the President of

Bophuthatswana, Lucas Mangope, regarded as a close ally of Pretoria, charged that the
government had broken undertakings given in negotiations with his administration.

Reuters North European News Service, July 29, 1986, A.M. Cycle (NEXIS News file).
Mangope has gone on record against dual citizenship. See, e.g., Claiborne, Transvaal
Blacks Face Dilemma, Wash. Post, Sept. 22, 1986, at A25, col. 1. This position could be
the show of ego of the head of an "independent" state, but it also might be the position
that the South African government desires Mangope to take: refusing to agree to the
restoration of citizenship. The Johannesburg Sunday Star called the Government's action

a "massive breach of faith," and the conservative newspaper Business Day said that
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predominately urban blacks who permanently reside in "white" South
Africa and who lost South African citizenship upon independence of
'
their "homeland." 96
Rural blacks in non-independent homelands will
also be eligible to reapply for citizenship. The Act still excludes blacks
born in independent states after independence, who never had South African citizenship to lose, along with the approximately eight million residents of the independent states themselves.
The South African Government's position is in keeping with its new
acceptance of "the permanency of urban blacks" and recognition of the
need to accommodate the "legitimate political aspirations" of urban
blacks by structures within South Africa.97 Apparently, the legislation
was not intended to assist the bulk of those blacks stripped of citizenship
who are resident in the independent states. The South African Government certainly desired this state of affairs, but the legal and conceptual
difficulties the government foresaw with a re-extension of citizenship to
the residents of what are considered "independent states" probably reinforced South Africa's decision.9"
Although the Restoration of Citizenship statute appears to be intentionally vague, complex and confusing, it defines the crucial "citizenship
by birth" by resurrecting the key concept of "permanent residence" from
the now repealed Urban Areas Act.9" Although this crucial term
designating the primary qualifications for South African citizenship remains undefined in the new Act, it presumably would take its meaning
"gullible folk who took President Botha at his word have been tricked." Wash. Post,
July 28, 1986, at A13, col. 3. Far from offering a "direct contradiction of grand
apartheid," as stated by Alan Cowell, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1986, at 8, col. 5, the legislation more accurately appears to streamline grand apartheid to accommodate a limited
number of black laborers.
96. As was the intent made clear by President Botha in September of 1985. See
September Statement by P. W. Botha, supra note 3, at 8-9.
97. See SUMMARY OF THE WHITE PAPER ON URBANIZATION, supra note 57, at 5;
see also September Statement of P. W. Botha, supra note 3, at 7-8.
98. Though the Government had no such difficulties when it passed the National
States Citizenship Act, No. 26 (S. Afr. 1970).
99. See Restoration of South African Citizenship Act § 2(a)(i-ii), No. 73 (S.Afr.
1986), which sets out the primary grounds for restoration of citizenship as follows: A
citizen of an independent state shall be a South African citizen by birth if born in the
Republic before the independence-conferring statute and ceased to be a South African
citizen by way of that statute and (i) immediately before the commencement of this Act
was permanently resident in the Republic and has been so resident since becoming a
citizen of that independent state; and (ii) informs the Director-General in writing of
desire to regain South African citizenship. See also, e.g., Mathebula v. Ermelo Municipality, 1955 (IV) S. Afr. L. Rep. 443, 444-45 (discussing permanent residence).
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from section 10 of the old Urban Areas Act which delineated the exemptions allowing blacks to live in urban areas.1 0 0 These exemptions at least
would be valid evidence of permanent residence. While those who had
the exemptions entitling them to section 10(1)(a) through (c)1 °1 rights
under the Urban Areas act would almost certainly be permanent residents under the Restoration of Citizenship Act, the government might
view those with mere administrative permission under section 10(1)(d) 0 2

100. The explicitly discriminatory legislation prohibited blacks from remaining in
prescribed urban areas for more than 72 hours unless they had obtained an exemption by
way of: a sustained period of continuous lawful residence since birth in the area; continuous employment within the area for one employer for not less than ten years; continuous
residence within the area for not less than fifteen years as the wife or dependent of such
a person and resident with him in that area; or permission to remain in the urban area.
Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act § 10(1)(a)-(d), No. 25 (S. Afr. 1945), repealed
by The Abolition of Influx Control Act, No. (S. Afr. 1986) (effective July 1, 1986).
The fact that blacks may no longer acquire a right of permanent residence under section
10 means that blacks are ironically in a worse position than they were prior to the repeal
of the pass laws and related influx control legislation. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
101. Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, § 10(1)(a)-(c), No. 15 (S. Afr. 1945),
reads:
10. Restriction of right of Blacks to remain in certain areas.-(1) No Black shall
remain for more than seventy-two hours in a prescribed area unless he produces
proof in the manner prescribed that(a) he has, since birth, resided continuously in such area; or
(b) he has worked continuously in such area for one employer for a period of
not less than ten years or has lawfully resided continously in such area for a period of not less than fifteen years, and has thereafter continued to reside in such
area and is not employed outside such area and has not during either period or
thereafter been sentenced to a fine not exceeding five hundred rand or to imprisonment for a period exceeding six months; or
[Para. (b) substituted by § 3 of Act No. 97 of 1978.]
(c) such Black is the wife, the unmarried daughter, or the son under the age of
eighteen years, of any Black mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection
and, after lawful entry into such prescribed area, ordinarily resides with that
Black in such area; or ...
[Para. (c) amended by § 6 of Act No. 16 of 1979.]

102. Id., § 10(1)(d).
10. Restriction of right of Blacks to remain in certain areas.-(1) No Black shall
remain for more than seventy-two hours in a prescribed area unless he produces
proof in the manner prescribed that-. .
(d) in the case of any other Black, permission so to remain has been granted by
an officer appointed to manage a labour bureau in terms of the provisions of paragraph (a) of sub-section (6) of section twenty-one ter of the Black Labour Regulation Act, 1911 (Act No. 15 of 1911), due regard being had to the availabiity of
accommodation in a Black residential area. ..
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typically, migrant laborers on successive one year contracts - as residents elsewhere.
Moreover, only those eligible blacks who affirmatively apply in writing to have their citizenship restored under the new statute will reacquire citizenship. An effective prerequisite for the restoration of citizenship is thus awareness of the right to citizenship and either the ability to
act on that right or access to someone who can help claim the right, two
attributes unavailable to many politically unaware, isolated, and illiterate or uneducated South African blacks.
The cumbersome application process required is also extremely discouraging. According to the basic terms of the Act, a person must prove
birth in the Republic of South Africa before the independence date of the
relevant homeland, as well as permanent residence in "non-black" South
Africa (that is, outside of the "independent state") since the date of independence and immediately prior to July 1, 1986. In some cases, proof of
permanent residence may require affidavits or more complex evidence.
The application lines for citizenship have proven to be long and the
forms difficult to complete. Worse still, the government issues the identity and citizenship documents only after approximately two months.1 03
Many blacks view with suspicion the new identity documents which
gradually will replace the old pass books'" since the books contain much
of the same information as the old reference books. Other blacks simply
will not apply for the new identity documents because they distrust the
white authorities 0 5 who have insisted for years that the old reference
books be carried at all times. This fear, combined with the gradual
phase-in of the new identity documents, 0 6 means that the old reference
books probably will continue to be used for quite some time.
The South African government made clear in regulations published on
July 25, 1986, that the eight million blacks living in the nominally inde-

103. See N.Y. Times, July 6, 1986, at 8, col. 5.
104. The Identification Act of 1986, No. (S. Afr. 1986). This Act only partially
repeals the Population Registration Act, No. 30 (S. Afr. 1950), which classifies all South
Africans on the basis of race as either White ("European"), Indian, Coloured or African.
The classifications in the Population Registration Act continue to be cross-referenced as
part of the information required by the new identity documents.
105. See N.Y. Times, July 6, 1986 at 8, col. 5.
106. The Identification Act of 1986 § 8(3), No. - (S. Afr. 1986). An important
object of the Act is "the gradual phasing in of the proposed new identity documents and
coupled therewith the gradual phasing out of the existing identity documents and reference books, as it is not possible to replace at once the approximately 13 million reference
books already issued with new identity documents." Memorandum on the Objects of the
Identification Bill, 1986, § 3.
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pendent states will continue to be viewed as noncitizen aliens in the land
of their birth."' 7 Black children born in the independent homelands after
independence also will be aliens. That the government actually views the
citizen-residents of the independent states as "aliens" is indicated by a
comment made by Dr. Johan Pretorius, Chief Director of Migration,
shortly after the new regulations were issued: the regulations would
bring "alien blacks in line with other aliens."'0 8 Although the "independent" and nonindependent homelands are integrally connected geographically, historically and economically to "non-black" South Africa, and no
other country besides South Africa even recognizes the existence of the
"independent" states, the South African government will treat migrant
workers from those states as if they were full aliens, for example, from
France or the United States. Yet the black "alien" migrant worker from
the "independent" state would not be treated as hospitably as a white
national from France or the United States. The black "alien" migrant
worker, unlike the white foreign visitor, almost certainly would be disabled from acquiring citizenship by naturalization. Even if the naturalization criterion of ready assimilation "with the European inhabitants of
the Republic"' 0 9 were not present, the naturalization provision in the
South African Citizenship Act, like that of the Restoration of South African Citizenship Act, requires proof of right to permanent residence in
South Africa." 0 As if that were not difficult enough, the Aliens Act
makes it especially difficult for a foreigner to get permanent residence
rights unless the Immigrants Selection Board determines that the alien is
going to fulfill a job need not already sufficiently met by inhabitants of

107. See Memorandum of the Home Affairs Department of the Republic of South
Africa (July 25, 1986). The regulations provide that migrant workers from the independent states are "aliens" whose employment is governed by the Aliens Act, No. 1 (S. Afr.
1937), which requires that employers have work permits in order to hire aliens, that
prior to aliens' employment a "no objection to recruiting" recommendation be acquired
from the Department of Manpower, and that consent from the Department of Home
Affairs also be acquired. Failure to observe these requirements is an offense with heavier
penalties than those under the Urban Areas Act. See Christian Science Monitor, July 29,
1986, at 36, col. 4; see also SUMMARY OF THE WHITE PAPER ON URBANISATION,
supra note 57, at 8 (international migration control). The regulations thus prevent employers from hiring independent state residents without the consent of the Department of
Home Affairs because they are considered aliens.
108. Summary of World Broadcasts (British Broadcasting Corporation, July 29,

1986).
109. See Aliens Act § 4(3)(b), No. 1 (S. Afr. 1937); see also South African Citizenship Act § 10(1)(c), No. 44 (S. Afr. 1949).
110. South African Citizenship Act § 10(1)(c), No. 44 (S.Afr. 1949); Restoration of
South African Citizenship Act § 2(a)(i), No. 73 (S. Afr. 1986).
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South Africa. l"" Thus, citizenship policy has become the new form of
influx control, granting bureaucrats discretion over whether "independent state" citizens have established housing and employment so as to be
able to move to "white" urban areas.112 Passports have, in essence, replaced passes.
In summary, the new situation may be described as follows. The
South African government's geographical frame of reference has
changed; when officials speak of the "Republic of South Africa" they
mean the residual geographic area including the homelands but excluding the "independent states." The nonindependent homelands will retain
the "option" of "independence." The government envisions Indians and
Coloreds as formally equal citizens of this new South Africa, but the
segregated chambers of Parliament confirm that in terms of social position and power Indians and Coloreds will be essentially second-class citizens. Urban (and rural) blacks permanently residing in South Africa,
including the nonindependent homelands, have the option of applying for
restoration of South African "citizenship." Although this could result in
an individual gaining the status of dual citizenship of both South Africa
and the independent state, the added layer of South African citizenship
more closely approximates a layer of nationality, or international legal
protection, because South Africa continues to deny significant domestic
law rights including the franchise.1 Is Thus, "black citizenship" would
not even amount to a third-class citizenship under the South African
government's distorted concept of citizenship. Yet South Africa conceivably could afford to grant some form of franchise to its new urban black
"citizens," because so many black South Africans remain aliens, completely excluded from the South African community. "Orderly Urbanisation" is simply the latest euphemism for separate development because
separate living areas, the "independent states," and the migrant labor
system will be preserved.1 1 4 Not only has "citizenship" not been restored
as the government promised the disenfranchised black majority, since the
equal rights implied by the concept of citizenship are absent from the
term as used by the South African government, but even this nationality
in the guise of citizenship is available only to a limited number of peo111.
112.

Aliens Act § 4(3)(d), No. 1 (S. Afr. 1937).
Cf. West, From Pass Courts to Deportation:ChangingPatternsof Influx Con-

trol in Cape Town,

AFRICAN AFFAIRS

476 (1983); Budlender, supra note 64, at 7.

113. The citizenship afforded those blacks who apply for it thus more resembles the
status of United States blacks under slavery than it does modem citizenship. See Dred
Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 343 (1857).
114. See SUMMARY OF THE WHITE PAPER ON URBANISATION, supra note 57,

passim.
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ple. For about eight million South African blacks, the severe consequences of exclusion from citizenship will continue.
E. The Consequences of Continued Alien Status
"Aliens" from the "independent states" are subject to almost unbridled administrative discretion due to the traditional executive power
granted over aliens by South African legislation and English common
law. The South African Aliens Act of 1937 reveals a remarkable xenophobia that has led to severe restrictions on aliens' freedom of movement,
residence rights and labor rights. The Aliens Act does not distinguish
between aliens of the "independent states" and aliens of legitimate sovereign states. Aliens may not enter the Republic without permission and
are subject to summary arrest and deportation.115
South African common law, which grants broad reign to executive
power as a result of the English notion of the Crown's prerogative, complements the harsh provision of the Aliens Act."' The Republic of South
Africa Constitution Act of 1961 and the new constitution codify many of
the executive powers.11 7 Under the English notion of the Crown's prerogative, any rights granted to aliens exist strictly at the whim and license of the Crown. The discretion of the executive over aliens is absolute, especially with regard to issues of admission and deportation. In
Musgrove v. Chun Teeong Toy,""8 the Lord Chancellor wrote that the
plaintiff, a Chinese alien, could maintain his action in British Court only
"if he can establish that an alien has a legal right, enforceable by action,
to enter British territory. No authority exists for the proposition that an
119
alien has any such right."

This position has led to quite expansive language in a number of
South African decisions and academic commentaries, to the effect that
aliens have "no rights" and the discretion of the executive over aliens is
"absolute."1 20 Yet usually the context in which this expansive language
115. See Aliens Act §§ 2.5, 5 bis, 5 ter, No. 1 (S. Afr. 1937).
116. Union Government of Estate of Whittaker, 1916 A.D. 194, 210; H. R. HAHLO
& E. KAHN, SOUTH AFRICA: THE DEvELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION,
ch. 4 (1960).
117. See South African Constitution Act § 7(4), No. 32 (S. Afr. 1961); Republic of
South Africa Constitution Act § 19, No. 110 (S. Afr. 1983).
118. 1891 A.C. 272.
119. Id. at 282; accord Atty. Gen. for Canada v. Cain, 1906 A.C. 542, 546 (State
has supreme power to refuse aliens entry or deport them at will).
120. See, e.g., Maluleke v. Minister of Internal Affairs, 1981 (I) S. Afr. L. Rep.
707, 711, 713; Administrateur Van Suidwes-Afrika v. Pieters, 1973 (I) S. Afr. L. Rep.
850, 861; Winter v. Administrator-In-Executive-Committee, 1973 (I) S. Afr. L. Rep.
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appears is narrower than the language itself would dictate.121 Even if
aliens are present in the Republic at the "license of the Crown," surely
their having this license is relevant to the issue of what rights they
possess.
Obliterating the distinction between belligerant, enemy aliens, and
friendly aliens has further confused the issue. In the case of enemy
aliens, the "leave and license of the Crown" is understandably
broader. 121 Yet judicial interpretation of restrictive South African legislation (like English common law) usually fails to distinguish between different types of aliens when taking rights away, even though the deprivation of rights should be reason for heightened judicial solicitude. 123 The
primary areas of administrative discretion which will concern the members of the black majority who continue to be "aliens" are immigration,
residence, and labor rights.
1. Immigration Rights and Deportation
In the area of immigration law, those blacks who have lost South African citizenship do not qualify for South African passports and, even if
lawful residents, may be deported at the whim of the executive. 1 24 The
government's arbitrary denial of passports12 5 to citizens of independent
873, 891; BOOYSEN, VOLKEREG 347 (1980).
121. The decision of the Bophuthatswana Supreme Court is the only reported decision on the applicability in South Africa of "international agreements" between the Republic and its former homelands, and the application of the audi alterum partum rule
(regarding the due process opportunity to be heard) was the narrow issue. Most of the
English precedent cited by South African judges and commentators relates to entry or
deportation. See, e.g., Maluleke v. Minister of Internal Affairs, 1981 (I) S. Afr. L. Rep.
708.
122. See, e.g., Beier v. Minister of the Interior, 1948 (III) S. Afr. L. Rep. 409, 452;
Hoch v. Soble, 1916 [Transvaal Provincial Div.] S. Afr. L. Rep. 642, 646; Labuschagne
v. Maarburger, 1915 [Cape Provincial Div.] S. Afr. L. Rep. 423, 429; Booysen, Admission of Aliens into the Republic, 90 S. AFR. L.J. 345, 347 (1973); Booysen, Treaties,
Enemy Aliens and Prisonersof War in South African Law, 90 S. AFR. L.J. 386, 388
(1973).
123. Cf Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
124. See Aliens Act § 8(2), No. 1 (S. Afr. 1937); see also Admission of Persons to the
Republic Regulation Act §§ 13(1), 16, No. 59 (S. Afr. 1972) (authorizing Minister of
the Interior to order removal of even lawful entrants if he deems it in the public interest).
The Internal Security Act § 14, No. 44 (S. Afr. 1950), also authorizes the deportation of
any person who is not a South African citizen and who has committed an offense under
the act or who is deemed undesirable because of "communist" affiliations.
125. When elder statesman of black protest Dr. Nthatho Motlana of Soweto's Civic
Association wanted to travel, South Africa insisted that he use a Bophuthatswanan passport. Dr. Motlana refused dozens of invitations from overseas because he did not want to
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states amounts to a serious deprivation of liberty, for although South
Africa does not recognize a right to domestic or international travel, 126
the administrative discretion exercised under the influx control laws was
at least subject to a limited judicial review. The repeal of the influx
control laws combined with the traditional deference to the executive by
the judiciary in the field of foreign affairs, however, has increased the
scope of administrative power dramatically.
South African law does not deviate from international law by allowing
the state executive to deport and exclude aliens. By the fiction of creating
"independent states" carved out of South Africa, however, the government has created a unique and efficient means of ridding itself of "undesirable" (namely black) inhabitants of the country. The Minister of the
Interior's decision to remove even lawful entrants under the Admission
of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act is not subject to review, and
he is not required to give any justification for his decision. 2 7 In the past,
the government has used this Act to get rid of political opponents, but
increasingly, however, the government uses it for routine population removals. This law was invoked to deport thousands of the Crossroads
squatters outside Capetown in late 1981 to their "independent states" of
Ciskei and Transkei without court proceedings.
The inverse of deportation is the government's ability to exclude nonSouth African citizens by refusing them admission into the Republic.128
By compounding fiction on fiction, the government has for several years
refused admission post hoc to those deemed citizens of "independent
states" who reside in the Republic and ordinarily would qualify for urban residence rights under influx control legislation. The Local Development Board often responds to the applications of these people for residence rights by alleging that the only way they can be admitted would be
through "diplomatic channels." As authority for this position the Local
Development Board cites "interstate agreements" between the Republic
of South Africa and the "independent states" which require the permis-

accept the implication that he was not a South African citizen, or take the risk that if he

went without a passport he would be unable to return. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at 30,
col. 1.
126. Nor is there an international right to travel recognized by the United States.
Compare Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (passport may not be denied on basis of
political beliefs) with Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (revocation of passport authorized by Congress).
127. Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act §§ 13-16, No. 59 (S. Afr.
1972); see also, supra note 118.

128. Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act §§ 32-37, No. 59 (S. Afr.
1972).
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sion of the respective governments before entry is allowed. The only
changes are that now residence rights no longer may be achieved through
influx control legislation, and residence or work permits for "immigrants" and their families from the "independent states" must be sought
from the Department of Manpower and the Department of Home Affairs. The residence or work permit so granted, moreover, will be no
shield against summary deportation. 2 9
2.

Residence Rights

Because permanent residence in the Republic is the key to restoration
of South African citizenship, residence rights are precisely what the
"aliens" of the "independent states" do not have. Although the Restoration of South African Citizenship Act leaves "permanent residence" undefined, the new regulations make clear that residents of any of the independent states who work in "white" South Africa while their families
remain in the independent state will be considered alien migrant laborers
ineligible for permanent residence.' 3 0 "Independent state citizens" in
South Africa usually were present illegally under the now repealed pass
laws. Consequently, as with illegal aliens in other countries, they desperately sought to avoid seeking the very sort of evidence they now need to
establish permanent residence.' Both "independent state" and nonindependent state citizens will continue to be subject to the provisions of the
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act."3 2 This Act prevents squatting on
public or private land and allows for the summary removal of squatters.
Those who successfully apply for work permits will receive only temporary residence permits. Nor will the issuance of a work permit entitle the

129, Aliens Act § 2(a) (permanent residence permits issued only to those capable of
ready assimilation with the European inhabitants of the Republic), § 5 (temporary residence permits, subject to cancellation at any time under § 8(2)), § 7 (Ministerial exemption from prohibition on aliens' residence, which may be withdrawn at any time under §
7(3)-(4)), No. 1 (S. Afr. 1937); see also, supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
130. Compare the position of most migrant laborers under the now repealed Urban
Areas Act. See supra note 93; cf. Rikhoto v. East Rand Administration Board, 1983 (IV)
S, Afr. L. Rep. 278, afd, Oos-Randse Administrasieraad v. Rikhoto, 1983 (III) S. Afr.
Rep. 595 (holding invalid state policy of refusing to consider ten successive one-year
migrant labor contracts to be continuous employment for ten years so as to meet the
requirements for permanent residence rights under section 10 of the Urban Areas Act).
131. This is precisely the problem facing many illegal aliens otherwise eligible under
the amnesty provision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, No. (S.
Afr. 1986) (effective Nov. 6, 1986).
132. Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, No. 52 (S. Afr. 1951).
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wife or family of the worker to live with him.133 "Aliens" have no right
to reside in South Africa.
3.

Employment Rights

As suggested in the discussions of immigration and residence rights
above, the future position of the "independent state" worker in South
Africa will be tenuous. He will work only as a migrant worker, and only
so long as the authorities wish to allow him to work. Criminal penalties,
including imprisonment as well as stiff fines, will apply to employers
who hire illegal "aliens" or employ them on terms contrary to their permission to be in South Africa. 3 " "Aliens" have no right to work in
South Africa.
4.

Life in the Homelands

Life in the homelands, "independent" or nonindependent, is a dreary
affair at best.Y5 The homelands are situated on the most arid, unattractive land in the country, and are extremely underdeveloped and
overpopulated. Incredibly, but not surprisingly, the South African government has persisted in relocating blacks to the homelands despite government-commissioned studies which indicate that the land can tolerate
no more people.1 3 6 Overgrazing and soil erosion are severe problems.
Less than one-fourth of Ciskei, for example, is free of soil erosion. During the international crusade in the last two years to help victims of
famine in Ethiopia and other African nations, starvation, malnutrition,
and infant mortality in parts of certain homelands were as bad as that in
Ethiopia. Yet this starvation exists in South Africa, one of the wealthiest
countries in the world.
In theory, the homelands are supposed to be economically viable; in
practice, they are wholly dependent on South Africa. Separate develop133. In contrast to the situation of migrant laborers from the nonindependent homelands as determined in Komani v. Bantu Affairs Administration Board, Peninsula Area,
1980 (IV) S. Afr. L. Rep. 448. A woman who is an "independent state" citizen and
wants to reside with her husband in South Africa, assuming he has accommodation, must
apply to the Foreign Affairs Department in each "state." There is already a shortage of
more than 400,000 homes for blacks in "white" South Africa. Financial Times, Apr. 2,
1986, at 3. Housing policy is thus another new form of influx control.
134. Aliens Act §§ 5(1)-(2), 10(2), No. 1 (S. Mr. 1937). Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 § 274A, No. (S. Afr. 1986) (effective Nov. 6, 1986) (employer
sanction adopted for the first time in the United States).

135. See generally, B. ROGERS, DIVIDE AND RuLE:
(1980).
136. E.g., Tomlinson Commission Report (1955).
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ment leads white South Africans to believe that the homelands are no
longer part of the wider South African economy.' South Africa produces on the average sixteen times as much output per head as the
homelands.' 3 8 Of economically active people in the homelands, only onefifth actually work there, two-thirds of these in subsistence agriculture.
Of the remaining four-fifths, two-thirds commute to work in "white"
South Africa." 9 Tens of thousands of black workers must get up hours
before dawn in homelands like KwaNdebele to begin the three-hour
journey to Pretoria, Johannesburg or Witbank."40 The South African
government has been forced to give the private bus company transporting
workers on these long routes, Putco, huge subsidies."" Seventy-one cents
on every dollar earned by residents of homelands is spent on imported
products, and thus, leaks back into the white economy.' 42 South Africa
has used the tool of citizenship to deny economic responsibility for the
homelands, spending far less than fifty percent per capita on
homelands'
43
inhabitants than on inhabitants of "white" South Africa.'
The physical poverty is paralleled by poverty of leadership. The South
African government usually establishes homeland leaders.' 44 The departure of South African power in the independent homelands has left
power vacuums often filled by self-serving and- corrupt officials. A high
degree of official lawlessness and repressive force prevails. 4 5
Millions of South Africans are citizens of homelands to which they
have never been or to which they have little connection. As one black
South African executive, now a citizen of QwaQwa, said:
By definition I'm South Sotho and my homeland is QwaQwa. But I don't
think of myself as South Sotho really. . . . I'm a cosmopolitan person. I
come from a rich, intertribal background. . . . In any case, QwaQwa

hasn't opted for independence yet. But the whole thing is ridiculous. Can

137.
Stakes,
138.
139.
140.

Accord Nattrass, South Africa's Status in the International Development
1 Indicator South Africa, Economic Monitor No. 3, at 3, 4 (1983).
Id. at 6, table 1.
Id. at 7.
Financial Times, May 6, 1986, at 4.

141. Id.
142. Nattrass, supra note 137, at 7-8.
143. See id. at 9, figure 2.
144. Some homeland leaders, like KwaZulu's Gatsha Buthelezi, are more independent than others but still are viewed by many as serving the purposes of Pretoria.
Buthelezi, however, has made a point of consistently refusing "independence" for
KwaZulu. E.g., L.A. Times, Aug. 11, 1986, at 2, col. 3.
145. See, e.g., Haysom, Human Rights Index, 2 S. ArR. J. HUM. RTS. 108, 129
(1986).
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you imagine the reaction of a white South African if there were a black
government here that suddenly said, "You have no political rights in
South Africa because you come from France, Germany or Holland. Even
if you are fourth generation, if you want to vote4 you must go back to
Europe. . . ." I've never even been to QwaQwa.2 6
If deported or "voluntarily relocated" by government pressure from their
home in South Africa to one of the "homelands, ' 1 4 blacks often find
themselves in a place where they know no one, have no house, no food
and no job. The "independent" and nonindependent homelands are third
world nations constructed for and by a first world country.
F. Prospectsfor Effective Citizenship
Effective citizenship for South African blacks entails some form of political rights, as suggested by the analysis of the modem meaning of the
concept of citizenship in Section II above. The South African government has hinted that it accepts this abstract proposition, but its citizenship policy to date precludes the extension of political rights to residents
of the independent homelands, and only holds out the possibility of drastically attenuated rights to those blacks acknowledged by South Africa as
citizens.
The new constitution, adopted in 1983, continues to completely exclude blacks from political representation. The new state strategy clearly
consists of co-option of a new black middle class (in the expansive sense
of Indians, Coloreds, and African black urban and rural "insiders")
which is expected to align with whites as a result of having a stake in the
system. The claims of many blacks to political rights will continue to be
denied on the grounds that they can exercise political rights in the "inde1 48
pendent states."
POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA, SOUTH
281 (1981).
147. Over 3.5 million people have been removed forcibly to the homelands since
1960. Wash. Post, Sept. 22, 1986, at Al, col. 1. South Africa announced plans to discontinue this policy in February 1985, but "voluntary relocations" continue. Platzy, Relocation in South Africa: A Review, 1 S. AFR. J. HuM. RTs. 270 (1985); see, e.g., Wash.
Post, Sept. 22, 1986, at Al, col. 1 (150,000 settlers from Bloedfontein and Geweerfontein
"resettled" to Bophuthatswana or Rust de Winter); N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1985, at A8,
col. 1 (government commission proposal to "resettle" 42,000 people in connection with
"consolidation" of KwaZulu).
148. Immediately after the government announced that citizenship would be restored
to South African blacks, officials made clear that "citizenship did not imply political
rights for those living in the homelands." N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1985, at A6, col. 3.
146.
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Regarding those blacks who are not eligible for restoration of South
African "citizenship," the Botha Government has suggested in recent
years that the problem of "power-sharing" may be approached from a
long-term vantage point.1 49 Yet affirmations of "separate development"
ideology inevitably have accompanied such statements. Thus, after the
announcement that citizenship would be restored, Botha announced his
desire to replace traditional apartheid with structures for "cooperative
coexistence." 150 He spoke of "units" that would be "recognized on a geographical and group basis," with each unit having "autonomy on matters
affecting only that unit, while the units on the central level should manage jointly matters of mutual concern. "151 This is precisely the structure
erected by the new constitution,' 512 but extended to the whole country
instead of merely "white" South Africa. The result would be some sort
of federal structure 58 or "constellation" of states, 5 perhaps of varying
degrees of legal independence or sovereignty, in which different classes of
people could be easily granted different qualities of rights. To this end,
President Botha has attempted to designate a "National Council" of
blacks, with the stated objective of discussing legislation affecting blacks
and ultimately drafting a new constitution for South Africa.' 55 Most
black leaders have rejected the "National Council," concluding that the
proposal is a delay tactic and that the separate structures envisioned by
the government merely will continue the "divide and rule" aspects of
separate development. 15 Only South African citizens can be appointed to
the Council. The ideology of separate development has constrained
blacks' chances for effective political power, and the rejection of black
enfranchisement suggests that it will continue to do so. Even if the gov-

149. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1985, at A6, col. 3.
150. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1985, at A6, col. 3.
151. Id.; see also N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1985, at Al, col. 6 (President Botha's speech
envisions "goal of co-responsibility of participation," but not "one-man one-vote in a
unitary system").

152. The new constitution of 1983 establishes separate chambers for Indians,
Coloreds, and Whites, enabling non-whites to exercise some power over what the Executive State President designates as "own affairs," such as housing, education and health,
but subject to the veto power of the white house of Parliament. See Republic of South
Africa Constitution Act, No. 110 (S. Afr. 1983).
153. See, e.g., Financial Times, Apr. 2, 1986, at 3.

154. See, e.g., THE CONSTELLATION OF STATES (W. Bretenbach ed. 1980).
155. President Botha announced the plan for a National Council in January 1986.
The Bill establishing the Council was published in May, asking for feedback by June
1986. See Summary of World News Broadcasting (British Broadcasting Corporation,
May 27, 1986).
156. See, e.g., Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 5, 1986, at 1.
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ernment takes the large step of offering the right to vote to some blacks
which it accepts as citizens, it will continue to exclude many other
blacks. Such an offer would be consistent with the demands of radical
right Afrikanerdom for a new state in which whites hold reinvigorated
and absolute political power.
Another power-sharing plan which has been considered (and now at
least tentatively rejected) is the Natal "Indaba," ' 5 7 a proposal for provincial government in Natal. While based in part on the principle of ethnic
separation - because it envisions an upper house divided into Zulus,
Indians, English, Afrikaners, and generic "South Africans," to complement the lower house elected by universal suffrage - the Natal Indaba
almost certainly would have resulted in a large black majority in the
lower house and a black Prime Minister of Natal. Structural protections,
including a bill of rights, were established to protect the rights of minorities, including whites. Nevertheless, the South African government refused to acquiesce in the dissolution of the KwaZulu homeland that
15
would have been entailed by the Natal Indaba experiment.
Negotiations with the "independent states" could yield restoration of
South African "citizenship" to more blacks, but until South Africa gives
that citizenship its modern meaning, the prospects for nonrevolutionary
achievement of black political power in South Africa are bleak. The
homelands/"independent state" structure might be difficult to dismantle,
given the creation of administrations and bureaucracies with vested interests in perpetuating their positions. Nevertheless, the South African
government has the actual power necessary to abolish the governments of
the homelands and independent states as well as the homelands and
states themselves. Such will be a necessary component of any transition
to a post-apartheid society. However, with citizenship and the homelands
structure, as with other areas of life long affected by apartheid legislation, social practices and patterns shaped by the law will not vanish with
the simple wave of the magic wand of reform.
Accompanying the new denial of political rights is the concomitant
decrease in legal protection afforded blacks who are relegated to the "independent states" or homelands. The law in the various independent
states consists of South African law existing at the time of independence,
which makes for much irrelevant law and confusion as to what home-

157. A Zulu word for "meeting of the people."
158. The draft Indaba proposals were rejected by Natal National Party leader Stoffel Botha in mid-December 1986. The final report was submitted to Pretoria in January
1987, and the government has delayed a "final decision" on the Indaba Proposal until
after the May 6, 1987 elections. See, e.g., Wall St.J., Feb. 11, 1987, at 18, col. 1.
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land legislation will be given effect at a given time. It is today difficult to
establish what the law in a given independent or nonindependent homeland is. Homeland legislation is often simply not available. Because the
"independent states" purport to be separate new legal entities, any liberal reforms taking place in South Africa have no effect in the independent states.159
IV.

CHALLENGING THE CITIZENSHIP POLICY

The thrust of this article so far has been to show that the modern
meaning of citizenship involves political rights, rights that are being denied by South Africa's policy of restricting citizenship on dubious
grounds and treating citizenship as if it were nationality. This Section
discusses different approaches to challenging South Africa's citizenship
policy.
Many logical and legal flaws in South Africa's citizenship policy exist,
but they all relate to the nature of a racially based denial of citizenship
pursuant to a plan designed to obscure existing racial discrimination.
South Africa uses a cloak of international law to disguise its denial of
political rights in domestic law. The fiction that states which have not
been recognized by any member of the international community are
"states," the fiction that these wholly dependent states are "independent," the fiction that ethno-linguistic categories are not "racial" categories, and the final fiction that citizens of an "independent state" are in
some sense "equal" to South African citizens because they have rights
"in their own state" all reveal that the citizenship policy amounts to a
political dispensation that is neither genuine nor fair. The dispensation
may be challenged on several fronts.
Specific legal flaws are discussed below in the context of possible legal
theories for litigation challenging the policy; the major conceptual flaws
are the attribution of citizenship based on ethnicity for blacks but not for
the ethnically diverse whites of South Africa, the belief that separate development will yield harmony rather than discord in race relations, and
the specious appeal to "self-determination" in justifying the policy. Of
these, self-determination is the logical flaw most relevant to legal.
challenge.

159. See, e.g., Whiteside & Haysom, A SeparateDevelopment: Labour Legislation
in the Homelands, 5 INDus. L.J. 251 (1984). This is especially true of the labor laws
making up the migrant labor system.
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A.

Domestic Legal Approaches

The citizenship policy is clearly not open to challenge in the domestic
courts of a nation other than South Africa because transnational law
typically excludes such overtly political issues. Although South Africa's
citizenship policy implicates what would be constitutional rights in other
countries, the opportunities for constitutional litigation within the domestic courts of South Africa are extremely circumscribed because of the
traditions of parliamentary sovereignty and only limited judicial review.
Summary deportation also bypasses the courts, for example, so little
room for maneuver in that area exists.1 60 Even to the extent that public
international law is accepted as part of South African law, which is a
controversial matter,lel the obstacles of legislatively curtailed jurisdiction
and a judicial review that largely is limited to the regularity of administrative proceedings prevent courts from questioning the validity of South
African legislation on international law grounds. Nevertheless, recourse
to international law remains a possible option for liberal judges interpreting vague or ambiguous provisions of the independence-conferring
62
statutes.'
Parliamentary sovereignty on the English model has long been the basis for the South African legal order, but the healthy English notion of
Parliament as protector of popular iberty has not taken hold in South
Africa. Consequently, the lack of a judicially enforceable bill of rights in
South Africa has greater significance than in England. Put simply, a
black whose rights of political expression, free movement, or equal protection are violated by South Africa's citizenship policy has little recourse
to South Africa's courts to challenge the violation.
Statutory interpretation replaces constitutional exegesis in South Africa."' 3 Statutory arguments challenging or obstructing the implementation of the government's citizenship policy are available. The Legal Re-

160. Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act §§ 13, 16, No. 59 (S. Afr.
1972).
161. Professor John Dugard and many commentators support an "incorporation"
theory and a comparative approach which locates international law norms within municipal law. Dugard, InternationalLaw is Partof Our Law, 88 S. AnR. L.J. 13 (1971); see
South At. Islands Dev. Corp. v. Buchan, 1971 (1) S. Afr. L. Rep. 234, 238 (citing
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)). For the contrary view, see

BooYsEN,

VOLXEREG (1980).

162. See Pitts, Judges in an Unjust Society: The Case of South Africa, 15 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & PoL'Y 49 (1986).
163. See Note, PublicInterest Law in South Africa, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 153, 178
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sources Centre"" in Johannesburg has long planned a test case in the
citizenship area but could not bring it until the government clarified its
position on urban blacks. Now that the new legislation makes clear that
blacks "permanently resident" in South Africa will be eligible for restoration of citizenship, it may be time to bring such a test case.
The specific arguments involved in this case would have to be planned
in careful detail, and it is best to limit public discussion, in any event, to
only the broad outlines of the arguments. One approach would be to
focus on the central concepts of "permanent residence" and "the Republic" in order to challenge at least part, rather than the whole, of the
government's citizenship policy. The goal of this test case would be to
expand the number of people eligible for South African "citizenship."
The test case would not in and of itself vindicate the distinctive rights of
citizenship suggested in Section II of this article. If the government actually imbued citizenship with limited political rights in the future, however, the beneficiaries of the test case would be able to profit from the
expansion of rights. Moreover, recognition of these rights by a South
African court would be a potent emotional and equitable reminder of the
continued connection with one's birthplace which South Africa has traditionally accepted in theory as the criterion for citizenship. The resultant
publicity would dramatize the issue for both domestic and international
audienc'es, give a moral boost to the opponents of separate development,
and force the South African government to deal with the millions of
"aliens" who, under this analysis, would not be aliens after all.
In general, the ambiguity of the terms "permanent residence" and
"the Republic" as used in the Restoration of South African Citizenship
Act could be exploited in arguments that more blacks have permanent
residence rights than the government expects, and that the "Republic" in
which they reside is larger than the small "white" South Africa contemplated by the government. Because the Act leaves the phrase "permanent
residence" undefined, blacks legitimately may argue that it includes not
only the permanent residence rights granted under the exemptions in
section 10(1)(a)-(c) of the Urban Areas Act, but also administrative permission granted under section 10(1)(d) of the Act.""5 Furthermore,
blacks could argue that the evidentiary burden of proving permanent residence should be exceedingly light, because they often were discouraged
from accumulating evidence of permanent residence by the now repealed

164. The Legal Resources Centre is the preeminent public interest law firm (on the
United States model) in South Africa. See id. at 167.
165. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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influx control laws. 6 6 Even squatters and temporary residence permit
holders could be helped if an enlightened court were to accept this position. Thus, permanent residence should be assumed for purposes of litigation to be an expansive concept, despite the likelihood that the government intended it to be a restrictive concept.
Similarly, a technical argument can be constructed that the ambiguous
and shifting use of the term "Republic" in the Restoration of Citizenship
Act means that more people qualify for citizenship than expected. In
interpreting the word "Republic," one has to deal with difficult problems
of space and time. The unique definition of "Republic" in the Act provides that the word takes on different meanings, and the state which is
the referent takes on different boundaries, depending on exactly where in
the Act the word appears, and to what in the Act the word refers.
In this Act a reference to the Republic, in relation to the birth, entry or
residence of a person in or into the Republic, shall be construed as a reference to the territorial limits of the Republic as constituted at the time of
167
such birth, entry or residence, as the case may be.
The implicit assumption is that the event of independence determines the
territorial boundaries of the Republic. Yet this assumption is not explicit
in the language of the statute. In addition, the assumption glosses over
the significant legal question of whether independence actually changed
the boundaries of the Republic, in light of the fact that no other nation
has recognized the "independent states." Further, this legislation itself
tends to undermine the scheme of spinning off "independent states" by
offering repatriation to some citizens of those "states."
The use of the word "Republic" is further flawed in that it sometimes
derives its meaning not from the event of independence but from the time
of "birth, entry, or residence." Section 2, which governs citizenship by
birth, provides:
Any person who in terms of an [independence-conferring statute] is a
citizen of an independent state, shall be a South African citizen by birth if
he - (a) was born in the Republic before the commencement of that Act
and ceased to be a South African citizen in terms of that Act and (i) immediately before the commencement of this Act was permanently
166. South African blacks subject to the Restoration of South African Citizenship
Act should, in fact, be more successful with this argument than illegal aliens subject to
the new U.S. Immigration Reform Act. This is because the purpose of the latter act are
contradictory (providing for sanctions as well as amnesty), while the explicit purposes, at
least, of the former act are ameliorative.
167. Restoration of South African Citizenship Act § 1(2), No. 73 (S. Afr. 1986).
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resident in the Republic and has been so resident since he became a citizen
of that independent state; and (ii) informs the Director-General in writing
that he is desirous of regaining South African citizenship. .... "I
According to the plain meaning of the statute the reference to the "Republic" in section 2(a) takes its meaning from birth before the event of
independence, but the reference to "the Republic" in the continuation of
the same sentence in 2(a)(i) is to residence after the event of independence. In reality, the borders of the Republic probably changed in the
interim. The second reference to the Republic, therefore, may have a
different meaning from the first reference to a variable but larger "Republic." The thrust of this interpretation is that the flexible definition of
"the Republic" given in the Act is incoherent. A liberal judge either
could throw out the narrow definition of "Republic" on this ground, or
hold that the Act clearly contemplates a time before independence, so
that the original "black and white" South Africa should be the reference
point for eligibility for restored South African citizenship.
Both of these examples of creative approaches to statutory interpretation are vulnerable to more restrictive readings by positivistic judges, but
both indicate the type of argument needed to point out the deficiencies in
the new citizenship legislation. As mentioned above, the advantages of
test cases challenging the citizenship policy are limited; the chances for
success are not very great, and even an absolute victory would achieve
only nationality for blacks, in the guise of citizenship, and in which those
newly eligible for citizenship could share. Yet the arguments used in the
test case also could be used at the administrative level, where blacks will
be applying for residence rights, identity documents and restoration of
citizenship. The chances of helping even a few people in even a small
way make the effort worthwhile. At the very least, the test case would
serve to publicize the issue both within and without South Africa.
B.

InternationalLegal Approaches

While the modern concept of citizenship has developed in conjunction
with the international law on human rights, the rights of citizenship as
such have not yet crystallized as rights enforceable under international
law. The legal flaws in South Africa's citizenship policy impact human
rights in general so significantly that international litigation on related
but more traditional legal theories is a desirable alternative. International litigation would highlight the problematic statehood of the "independent states." Moreover, it would challenge the South African govern168. Id., § 2(a)(i)-(ii).
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ment's reliance on self-determination and international law for its policy
of treating the black majority as a group of "aliens" subject to surveillance, exclusion and deportation. This litigation might add a new and
legally authoritative voice, such as the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), to the increasingly weak and repetitive condemnations of
apartheid by the General Assembly and Security Council of the United
Nations, and by individual states."6 9 While international pressure
through political channels remains important, rhetorical posturing alone
is insufficient to challenge South African policies. The new significance
of the citizenship policy requires a new strategy.
Because recognition by the international community is linked to legal
existence, the states created by the citizenship policy have only a dubious
and tainted statehood. Although they have the traditional prerequisites of
de facto statehood,17 0 the "independent" states remain dependent on
South Africa both economically and politically. Doubts about their ability to effectuate the rights and duties of independent states persist.
South Africa finds self-determination attractive because it is enshrined
in various international legal documents"" and has served as the basis
for third world decolonization. When opposition members of the Progressive-Reform Party attacked Nationalist plans for the independence of
Transkei, for example, Nationalists responded by calling the opposition
"imperialists" and "colonials.' 7 2 On its face, the principle of self-determination might seem to apply, because independence is being granted to
territories, much as it was during the decolonization movement. Simultaneously arguing for Namibian independence and nonrecognition of
South Africa's "independent states" may therefore seem inconsistent." 3

169. Over 100 increasingly virulent General Assembly resolutions dealing with
South Africa's racial policies have been passed.
170. These prerequistes include: permanent populace, defined territory and capacity
for international relations. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 137 (6th ed. 1963).
171. E.g., Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
People, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960); U.N. Charter, ch. IX, art. 73; Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories; International Covenant of Economics, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16)
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
172. Johannesberg Star, June 9, 1976; Rand Daily Mail, May 26, 1976.
173. Though most commentators see the colonial situation of Namibia as presenting
distinct legal issues reconciliable with the arguably noncolonial context of the "independent" states, e.g., Richardson, Self-Determination, InternationalLaw and the South African Bantustan Policy, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185 (1978), other commentators
have tried to argue that self-determination is achieved by the citizenship policy, at least
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On the other hand, the principle of self-determination involves the right
of people to determine freely their own destiny. The black majority of
South Africa clearly has not done this. The citizenship policy has been
condemned repeatedly as a violation of the principle of self-determination.17 4 Because the territory of South Africa contains both blacks and
whites, and the black majority has had no say in its political future,
South Africa may not be simply analogized to other economically exploitive colonial powers. Secessionist demands made to a colonial or quasicolonial oppressor (as in India, Canada, the United Kingdom and Israel)
may be distinguished from unilaterally imposed grossly unfair land distribution and grant of "independence."
Self-determination is complicated in a multi-ethnic context, because
the meaning of the principle depends in large part on the definition of
the "self" which has the right to determine its future. In a multi-ethnic
context, the claims of ethnic integrity often are pitted against the claims

with regard to the Transkei (alleged to have had a prior history of greater "independence" from South Africa). See, e.g., de Kieffer & Harquist, Transkei: A Legitimate
Birth, 13 NEw ENG. L. REv. 428, 447 (1978); Swan, Self-DeterminationPretoriaStyle:
The Case of the Transkei, 3 WHrrTIER L. REv. 475, 491-93 (1981). But cf. Swan,
Comparative ConstitutionalLaw - Communal Self-Determination in the Republic of
South Africa's New Constitution: A Comparative Perspective on a CriticalExperiment,
7 WHITTIER L. REV. 349, 374 (1985) (communal self-determination of Indians and
Coloreds possible only in theory under new constitution; blacks still excluded). The claim
that Transkei has any particular historical claim to independence has been decisively
refuted. E.g., Norman, The Transkei Revisited, 13 NEw ENG. L. REV. 792, 794-95
(1978). The argument that the "independent" homelands manifest the principle of selfdetermination has even less merit in light of the lack of a choice on the part of the
peoples said to have the right of self-determination, the disruption of the territorial integrity of South Africa, and the consistent condemnations of the international community
precisely on this point. Thus, Dugard writes of
the notion that the right of self-determination is now a peremptory norm of the
character of jus cogens, the violation of which renders an act null and void. This
development provides the clue to the non-recognition of South Africa's independent
national states. They have come into existence in violation of a peremptory norm
of contemporary international law - the right of self-determination - and this
renders them nullities under international law.
Dugard, Book Review, 103 S.AFR. L.J. 316, 317 (1986) (reviewing J. Nkala, The
United Nations, InternationalLaw, and the Rhodesian Independence Crisis (1985)).
174. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 31/6, 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. "(No. 39) at 10, U.N. Doc.
A/31/39 (1976); G.A. Res. 2775, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) at 39, U.N. Doc. A/
8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 3411, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 35, U.N. Doc. A/
10034 (1975); G.A. Res. 2775, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) at 39, U.N. Doc. A/
8429 (1971); Organization of African Unity: Resolution on Non-recognition of South
African Bantustans, O.A.U. Doc. CM/Res. 493 (XXVII) (adopted at Port Louis, Mauritius, June 24 - July 3, 1976).
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of a common view of human rights cutting across heterogeneous peoples.
Because of the risks to broad respect for human rights, the Organization
of African Unity has been committed to the principle that African borders are not to be restructured simply to accommodate ethnic desires. It
is not a coincidence that many homeland leaders are staunch ethnic
chauvinists at the same time they express opposition to racial discrimination. Although both whites and blacks may have the right to a voice in
their respective futures, the denial of that voice to the black majority is
one reason the world community has refused to recognize the "independent states." Application of the principle of self-determination in its true
sense would condemn the original establishment of separate "states" and
would allow members of the black majority to choose between homelands
citizenship or South African citizenship. The alternative expounded by
the South African government entrenches racially discriminatory allocation of land and application of law without any determination of the
black majority "self" of South Africa.
The ICJ is a problematic forum for the citizenship issue for three
reasons. First, because the ICJ is the judicial arm of the anti-South African United Nations; second, because it is set up to settle interstate disputes; and third, because it has no effective means of enforcing its judgments. Bringing an ICJ suit regarding South Africa is especially
difficult, because South Africa does not accept the "compulsory" jurisdiction of the World Court.1 75 Thus, contending states could not submit a
case to the ICJ, and theoretical problems of defining "states" with standing and framing such a case do not arise.
Yet the ICJ is available to review South African independence-conferring legislation in a way in which domestic South African courts are not.
An advisory opinion of the ICJ (requested by the General Assembly or
the Security Council of the United Nations) is a possible form for such a
judgment. 76 Professor John Dugard of the University of Witwatersrand

175. As defined by article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (the
"optional clause"). As of 1984, only 47 states had filed declarations of acceptance of the
optional clause, some with significant reservations. South Africa is, however, one of the
160 states that are parties to the Statute of the ICJ. 1983-1984 I.C.J.Y.B. 41, 57 (1984).
The United States withdrew from compulsory jurisdiction effective April 1986. As of
January 1986, 45 declarations of acceptance under I.C.J. Statute article 36 were still in
force. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) 159 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1985).
176. Article 96(1) of the United Nations Charter and article 65(1) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice allow the General Assembly or the Security Council to
seek an advisory opinion on any question of international law, the existence of any fact
which, if true, would breach an international obligation, or the nature and extent of
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has advocated such an approach, 17 in which South Africa's agreement to
submit a case to the ICJ is unnecessary. Advisory opinions are not binding, but are legally authoritative statements of international law. South
Africa itself once requested an advisory opinion from an ICJ more sympathetic to South Africa, on the issue of its discriminatory treatment of
Indians, but the government could not get the General Assembly in 1946
to support its request. Dugard has noted that this "refusal to request an
advisory opinion on South Africa's racial policies was a tactical error on
the part of the international community." 7 8 The General Assembly has
been willing to request advisory opinions on the South West Africa/
Namibia issue, as opposed to the domestic apartheid issue. The Security
Council requested an advisory opinion on Namibia in 1970. The resulting 1971 Advisory Opinion on Namibia 17 9 by the ICJ undoubtedly has
spurred progress toward Namibian independence. In that opinion, separate development as applied to Namibia was found contrary to United
Nations Charter provisions requiring observation of human rights without regard to race.
One reason that the General Assembly refrained from acting in 1946
was its hesitance to get involved in domestic issues subject to the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of states. South Africa's claim that its citizenship policy, like apartheid generally, is a domestic issue would have to be
dealt with before the ICJ could proceed. Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter provides that "Nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. . ." Yet this
provision was composed before the post-World War II revival of natural
law and the increased sensitivity to violations of human rights as reflected in international law and international organizations. Developments subsequent to World War II have established that apartheid, and
thus the most extreme version of apartheid represented by the citizenship
policy, is a matter of international concern. Even the original rationale of

reparations to be made for such breaches of international obligation. Most advisory opinions are requested by the General Assembly. Professor John Dugard first suggested this
route when Transkei was given independence. See Note, supra note 77, at 645.
177. Dugard, The Denationalization of Black South Africans in Pursuance of
Apartheid:A Questionfor the InternationalCourt ofJustice?, 33 INT'L COMM. OF JUR.
REv. 49 (1984).
178. Id. at 50. While South Africa has refused to recognize the validity of the
Court's advisory opinions on South West Africa/Namibia, those opinions have nevertheless encouraged South Africa to gradually move to conform to international expectations
with regard to Namibia.
179. See infra note 188.

19861

SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENSHIP

article 2(7) - state stability - has additional implications when one
remembers the numerous international resolutions declaring that
apartheid represents a threat to world peace.180 Large scale violations of
human rights like those occurring under South Africa's citizenship policy
rightly are recognized as implicating civil rights in other countries. The
legal issues arising from the citizenship policy may be framed as suitable
for judicial determination. For all these reasons, South Africa should not
be able to invoke article 2(7) as a "domestic issue" shield against the
operation of international law. If a more subtle justification for recognizing the international issues posed by the citizenship policy is needed, the
novelty and the extreme injustice of the policy provide this justification.
The political nature of legal issues involving the citizenship policy also
represents an obstacle to ICJ jurisdiction, because the World Court typically refrains from deciding political issues. For this reason, analysts try
to frame the political issues raised by the citizenship policy as narrow
legal issues. The attempt can only be partially successful, because the
distinction between law and politics in a society like South Africa is exceedingly thin. The attempt is understandable, however, because political
issues usually are seen as falling within the unique competence of organizations like the General Assembly and the Security Council, as opposed to the World Court. South Africa has ignored the many resolutions of the former bodies, and South Africa would be no less skeptical of
submitting the citizenship issue to the ICJ. Some commentators counsel
against involving the ICJ when the desire for a particular answer is
strong and manifest, as it is in this case."8 Yet, the fact that this case is
not a typical ICJ boundary dispute counsels in favor of choosing the
forum of the ICJ. The desirability of a particular result does not necessarily indict the judicial character of the decision. The stakes are high,
and public pressure will be brought meaningfully to bear on South Africa. International pressure spurred the development of South Africa's
citizenship policy;18 2 this same pressure may contribute to its demise.
Disillusionment with the ICJ as a vehicle for such pressure arose largely
from its pro-South African decision in South West Africa Cases of 1966,
but the 1971 advisory opinion on Namibia should have dispelled such
qualms. Although politics thus pervades the issues raised by the citizenship policy, the ICJ is most useful for considering aspects of the policy
that can be challenged under narrow legal theories.

180.
181.

See supra note 169.
E.g., M. POMERANCE, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE
COURT IN THE LEAGUE AND U.N. ERAS 377 (1973).
182. Note, supra note 77, at 645; Dugard, supra note 6, at 11.
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Article 38 of the ICJ statute denotes applicable sources of law as including international conventions, custom, general principles and previous decisions of the ICJ.8 3 Several legal theories that might indict the
citizenship policy exist, some more tenable than others. A broad claim of
an international right to share the collective wealth of South Africa,'"
for example, would be both dubious at law and unworkable in practice.
The argument that South Africa is an illegitimate government and thus
any states it purports to create are illegitimate is similarly too "political"
and too broad. The argument would be difficult to sustain legally. Fo.cusing on the citizenship policy itself is better. Although the citizenship
policy probably violates the right to self-determination of black South
Africans, the breadth of the concept of self-determination combined with
its traditional use in struggles for independence make self-determination
an unattractive theory for challenging the citizenship policy.18 5
The most viable legal theory for challenging the citizenship policy focuses on the racially discriminatory aspects of the policy, which violate
international law in both conception and implementation. Racial discrimination undoubtedly is disfavored in current international law and
custom, and South Africa is the only country on Earth that has institutionalized racial discrimination; the rest of the world has moved away
from such discrimination. There are several international covenants
against racial discrimination which have been adopted since the United
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights"8 6
condemned discrimination, but because South Africa has signed virtually
none of the covenants, it is not bound by their terms. 8 7 There also have
been statements by the ICJ and its members, notably the 1971 Namibia
Opinion, 88 condemning racial discrimination as a violation of interna-

183. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38. Note that the ICJ does not
follow stare decisis. Id., art. 59.
184. Under article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights regarding ownership of property, for example, more recent international covenants have dropped such a
reference.
185. Self-determination is nevertheless the legal violation emphasized by many commentators. E.g., Richardson, supra note 174, at 214; Note, supra note 77, at 629-31.
186. G. A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) (adopted by the U.N. over
eight abstentions, including that of South Africa).
187. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered intoforce Jan. 4, 1969).
188. Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 58; Barcelona Traction Case (Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd.), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32; Southwest Africa Cases
(Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), 1966 I.C.J. Pleadings 1, 285-88
(non-discrimination on the basis of race is a principle of international law) (Tanaka, J.,

dissenting).
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tional law.
From this general legal principle disfavoring racial discrimination, one
may argue that the citizenship policy is illegal because it is racially discriminatory in its conception and its effects. Casting the citizenship
rights as political rights would again suffer from the fault of being too
"political." The more "neutral" and "international" concept of nationality, however, might be a more suitable ground for a claim. Denationalization on racial grounds is an increasingly questionable practice under
international law. On one hand, traditional international law and its elevation of state sovereignty would allow a state to denationalize any of its
inhabitants at will.18 9 On the other hand, even the Hague Convention of
1930 declared that international conventions, custom and principles of
law limit the nationality laws of each state."' 0 A comprehensive survey
has concluded that "denationalization measures based on racial, ethnic,
religious, or other related grounds are impermissible under contemporary international law."""1 Contemporary writers lean toward the view
that "prohibition of discriminatory denationalization may be regarded as
a rule of present day international law. This certainly applies to discrimination on the grounds of race which may be considered as contravening
a preemptory norm of international law."' 92
Dugard notes four particular grounds taken from state practice, multilateral treaties and judicial decisions that support the argument that customary international law prohibits racially discriminatory deprivation of
nationality:19 3
1) The widespread opposition to the 1941 Nazi decree which denationalized German Jews;'"
189. E.g., Convention on Certain Question Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Laws, April 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89, ch. 1, arts. 1 & 2; I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 126 (2d ed. 1973); 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 683-84 (2d ed. 1970); see also Oliver, Statelessness and Transkeian Nationality, 2
S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 143, 154 (1976) (denationalization by South Africa was not
"solely" on racial grounds); Note, Nonrecognition of the Independence of Transkei, 10
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 167, 192 (1978).
190. Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws,
Apr. 12, 1930, art. I, 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 99.
191. MCDOUGAL, LAsswELL & CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 918
(1980); McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Nationality and Human Rights: The Protection
of the Individualin ExternalAreas, 83 YALE L.J. 900, 958 (1974); see also supra note
46.
192. P. WEIS, supra note 12, at 125.
193. Dugard, supra note 6, at 26-27.
194. P. WEIS, supra note 12, at 119-21; see also supra note 49.
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2) Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 95 which
declares that 'no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality';
3) Article 9 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 98 which
provides that a 'contracting state may not deprive any person or group of
persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political
grounds';
4) Article 5(d)(iii) of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination,"9 7 in which states undertake to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, equality before
the law, 'notably in enjoyment of the right to nationality'.
Because the ICJ's legitimate role includes crystallizing the current
trend of international legal principles, its recognition that South African
citizenship as now conceived violates international law would be within
its legitimate functions. An advisory opinion by the ICJ could take note
that a dispute of law may arise over the effects of the citizenship policy
(such as those outlined above in Section III) as well. For example, international law guarantees aliens minimum standards of treatment, yet
South Africa fails to observe these minimum standards with regard to its
new "aliens." Most aliens coming to South Africa are treated well, but
black citizens of the "independent states" are subject to all discriminatory laws that still exist in South Africa. Apartheid legislation does not
distinguish between black South Africans and blacks generally. The citizens of the independent states face the worst of both worlds - they have
lost their right to participate in their country's political system at some
future date, and they have not been granted the rights that normally
accrue to aliens.
An ICJ determination of the legality of South Africa's approach also
could consider the consequence of statelessness that follows from the citizenship policy. The new citizens of the "independent states" are stateless
to the extent that they have been deprived of South African nationality
while not having been ascribed the nationality of any recognized state."0 8
South Africa is a party to the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 199 but is not a party to the many other international conventions regarding stateless persons and refugees. South Africa's defense

195.

See supra note 186. This Declaration is not legally binding, however.

196. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 29, 1961, art. 9, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 9/15 (1961). This Convention has not entered into force.

197. See supra note 187.
198.

Some commentators sympathetic to the citizenship policy deny the possibility of

statelessness. E.g., Oliver, supra note 189.
199. Dugard, The Conflict Between InternationalLaw and South African Law, 2 S.
AFR. J. HuM. RTs. 1, 15 (1986).
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would be that the ascription of "independent state" nationality precludes
the possibility of statelessness resulting from its citizenship policy. The
practical reality of nonrecognition abroad, however, means that these
new "independent state" citizens are in fact stateless.
V.

CONCLUSION

Members of the black majority have not accepted separate development, of which the citizenship policy is the ultimate extension. Blacks
are aware that the citizenship policy exists to deny their claims to political and civil rights in South Africa. Forced deprivation of citizenship has
been a major source of bitterness in the black communty.200 Even now,
the government crushes nascent black protest in an endless cycle of violence, repression and more violence.
The South African government must accept that change is inevitable.
The South African population is inextricably mixed, and the homelands
are not viable either as "independent" or "nonindependent" states. A
political fantasy which breaks up the territory of the country into ministates is not the solution. Dialogue leading to full citizenship, genuine
democratic participation and self-determination by the whole of South
Africa is the only acceptable solution. Communities must be "closed" in
some sense, but they need not (and, really cannot) be completely homogenous. Tolerance can be, and is, a value that binds. Genuine restoration
of citizenship to all South Africans could be a powerful symbolic statement of such tolerance, and an open invitation to a post-apartheid society. A grant of universal citizenship would say that the artificial isolation
and separation of apartheid is over, and awareness of interdependence
and sensitivity to others has begun. As citizens of the melting pot which
is America are painfully aware, symbols of tolerance are often even more
important in creating a sense of community than the existence or nonexistence of tolerance in everyday interpersonal relations.
Challenges to South Africa's citizenship policy through domestic and
international litigation would complement existing avenues of international pressure to spur change in South Africa. While neither domestic
nor international legal approaches alone will accomplish immediate fundamental change, both will weaken the legal legitimacy of South African
policy and keep the issue before the international community. This litigation could result in the extension of nationality in the guise of citizenship to a greater number of people, which could prepare the way for a

200. Opened for signature Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force

June 6, 1960).
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South Africa in which the concept of citizenship takes on greater substance. Problems exist with stopping or reversing the process of "independence"; homeland leaders will resist giving up the benefits they now
enjoy as a result of the citizenship policy. The South African government, too, will undoubtedly be recalcitrant at first. The citizenship policy
is more integral to South Africa than Namibian independence. As with
Namibia, however, it is likely that the government will ultimately move
in the direction that the international community indicates. If the government does not move of its own free will, it might have to move later
of necessity.

